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AGGREGATION AS DISEMPOWERMENT:
RED FLAGS IN CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS
Howard M. Erichson*
ABSTRACT
Class action critics and proponents cling to the conventional wisdom that class actions
empower claimants. Critics complain that class actions over-empower claimants and put defendants at a disadvantage, while proponents defend class actions as essential to consumer protection
and rights enforcement. This Article explores how class action settlements sometimes do the opposite. Aggregation empowers claimants’ lawyers by consolidating power in the lawyers’ hands.
Consolidation of power allows defendants to strike deals that benefit themselves and claimants’
lawyers while disadvantaging claimants. This Article considers the phenomenon of aggregation
as disempowerment by looking at specific settlement features that benefit plaintiffs’ counsel and
defendants without benefiting class members. Recognizing that protection of disempowered class
members lies with judges who review settlement agreements, the Article identifies red flags to alert
judges to problematic settlement terms and fee requests. By showing how certain settlement features reflect improper cooption of the power of aggregation, the Article offers a framework for
understanding class action power dynamics and a path for reclaiming class actions as an
empowerment mechanism.

INTRODUCTION
Class actions empower plaintiffs; that is what we used to think. Aggregation levels the field, the theory goes, by creating economies of scale, by permitting investment based on aggregate stakes, and by offering leverage in
settlement negotiations.1 Class certification is supposed to turn David-versusGoliath into Goliath-versus-Goliath. Much of the bench, bar, and public still
© 2016 Howard M. Erichson. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce
and distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for educational
purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the
Notre Dame Law Review, and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Professor of Law, Fordham University. I am grateful to Sadia Ahsanuddin for
excellent research assistance; to James Brudney, Elizabeth Burch, John Coffee, Nestor
Davidson, Theodore Frank, Sean Griffith, Clare Huntington, Samuel Issacharoff, Thomas
Lee, Ethan Leib, Alan Morrison, Linda Mullenix, Judith Resnik, William Rubenstein, and
Benjamin Zipursky for helpful comments on earlier drafts; and to Fordham University for
a faculty fellowship that allowed me to conduct this research.
1 See, e.g., AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 1.02
reporters’ notes (2010); WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 1.7,
Westlaw (5th ed. database updated June 2016); Howard M. Erichson, Beyond the Class
Action: Lawyer Loyalty and Client Autonomy in Non-Class Collective Representation, 2003 U. CHI.
859
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seem to believe this gospel. Indeed, it is the one point on which class action
critics and class action proponents agree. Critics complain that class actions
over-empower plaintiffs and put defendants at a disadvantage,2 while proponents defend class actions on grounds of consumer protection and enforcement of rights.3
Aggregation still holds out the promise of empowerment, but, in too
many instances, collective litigation has become a tool for disempowering
claimants. The very thing that makes aggregation empowering—the separation of ownership and control that consolidates power in claimants’ lawyers—allows defendants to strike deals that benefit themselves and benefit
claimants’ counsel while disadvantaging claimants. The goal of this Article is
to understand this type of disempowerment both as a theoretical matter and
by examining specific features of class settlements. Too often, class settlements include terms that leave one scratching one’s head and wondering
why a settlement would include such a term. And too often, the answer is not
that the provision added value for the class, but rather that it served the
aligned interests of the defendant and class counsel. By cataloguing features
of class settlements that fit this description, this Article offers red flags that
judges should look for when evaluating settlements, that objectors should
LEGAL F. 519, 543–50; David Rosenberg, Mandatory-Litigation Class Action: The Only Option
for Mass Tort Cases, 115 HARV. L. REV. 831, 840–66 (2002).
2 See, e.g., Brief of The Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America et al.
as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 20, Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct.
1036 (2016) (No. 14-1146) (“Class actions are thus a ‘powerful tool [that] can give a class
attorney unbounded leverage . . . .’” (quoting S. REP. NO. 109-14 at 20 (2005))); Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2413 (2014) (“Halliburton and its amici
contend that . . . [class actions] allow plaintiffs to extort large settlements from defendants
for meritless claims . . . .”); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepción, 563 U.S. 333, 350 (2011)
(“Faced with even a small chance of a devastating loss, defendants will be pressured into
settling questionable claims.”); Class Action Litigation, QUINN EMANUEL TRIAL LAW., http://
www.quinnemanuel.com/practice-areas/class-action-litigation.aspx (last visited Oct. 6,
2016) (“We know a class action can quickly become a tool for litigation blackmail.”).
3 See, e.g., ELIZABETH J. CABRASER, 1 LITIGATING TORT CASES § 9:20 (2014) (“Aggregation is empowering. Class actions marshall scattered claimants with few resources and little
bargaining power into a unified force that defendants must reckon with. Courts have seen
such empowerment as a core purpose of class certification, which can transform economically infeasible claims into lawsuits whose market value matches their merits.”); see also Lee
v. Carter-Reed Co., 4 A.3d 561, 574 (N.J. 2010) (“A class action permits ‘claimants to band
together’ and, in doing so, gives them a measure of equality against a corporate adversary . . . . In short, the class action is a device that allows ‘an otherwise vulnerable class’ of
diverse individuals with small claims access to the courthouse.” (first quoting In re Cadillac
V8–6–4 Class Action, 461 A.2d 736, 741 (N.J. 1983); then quoting Iliadis v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., 922 A.2d 710, 728 (N.J. 2007))); Daniels v. Hollister Co., 113 A.3d 796, 802 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2015) (“[T]he class-action device was intended to empower ‘the
smaller guy’ . . . .” (quoting Iliadis, 922 A.2d at 719); Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Robert
Gebeloff, Arbitration Everywhere, Stacking the Deck of Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31, 2015), http:/
/www.nytimes.com/2015/11/01/business/dealbook/arbitration-everywhere-stacking-thedeck-of-justice.html?_r=0 (describing class actions as “realistically the only tool citizens
have to fight illegal or deceitful business practices”).
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highlight when fighting settlements, that defendants should hesitate to offer,
and that class counsel and class representatives should hesitate to demand or
accept. And by showing how these settlement features reflect defendants’
cooption of the power of aggregation, the Article aims to reframe how we
think about power dynamics in class actions in the age of settlement.
Objectionable class settlements are nothing new. For a while, coupons
were the remedy that everybody loved to hate.4 More recently, the popular
target became cy pres remedies that allocated settlement funds to charitable
organizations.5 But even as observers recognized particular instances of bad
class settlements,6 and even as the academic literature has long recognized
agency risks in class actions,7 many still perceive aggregation in general, and
class certification in particular, as empowering to claimants. Perhaps this is
because the most prominent class action disputes, unsurprisingly, involve disputed class actions.8 Thus, the class actions that get the most attention tend
4 See, e.g., Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 28 U.S.C. § 1712 (adopting rules for
coupon settlements); S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 30 (2005); Steven B. Hantler & Robert E. Norton, Coupon Settlements: The Emperor’s Clothes of Class Actions, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1343
(2005); Christopher R. Leslie, The Need to Study Coupon Settlements in Class Action Litigation,
18 GEO J. LEGAL ETHICS 1395 (2005); Edward Sherman, Consumer Class Actions: Who Are the
Real Winners?, 56 ME. L. REV. 223 (2004); Editorial, Class War, WALL ST. J., Mar. 25, 2002, at
A18. For a discussion of coupon settlements, see infra text accompanying notes 100–15.
5 See, e.g., ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, RULE 23 SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT at 22
(Apr. 9–10, 2015) (“Much concern has been expressed in several quarters about questionable use of cy pres provisions, and the courts’ role in approving those arrangements under
Rule 23.”); Martin H. Redish et al., Cy Pres Relief and the Pathologies of the Modern Class Action:
A Normative and Empirical Analysis, 62 FLA. L. REV. 617 (2010); Rhonda Wasserman, Cy Pres
in Class Action Settlements, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 97 (2014); James M. Beck & Rachel B. Weil, “Cy
Pres” Awards: Is the End Near for a Legal Remedy with No Basis in Law? 3–4 (Wash. Legal
Found. Critical Legal Issues Working Paper Series, Paper No. 188, 2014); Adam Liptak,
When Lawyers Cut Their Clients Out of the Deal, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 12, 2013) [hereinafter
Liptak, When Lawyers], http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/13/us/supreme-court-mayhear-novel-class-action-case.html; Adam Liptak, Doling Out Other People’s Money, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 26, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/26/washington/26bar.html. For a
discussion of cy pres settlements, see infra text accompanying notes 117–65.
6 See, e.g., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 21.61 (4th ed.
2004) (listing class action settlement abuses); Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions,
90 WASH. U. L. REV. 729, 732 (2013) (referring to “isolated—but highly publicized—
instances of abuse in which class attorneys obtained handsome fees while class members
received meager recoveries or worthless coupons”).
7 See, e.g., DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC
GOALS FOR PRIVATE GAIN (2000); John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort
Class Action, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1367 (1995); Howard M. Erichson, Mass Tort Litigation and Inquisitorial Justice, 87 GEO. L.J. 1983, 2002–03 (1999); Samuel Issacharoff, Governance and Legitimacy in the Law of Class Actions, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 337; see also AM. LAW INST.,
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 1.05(a) reporters’ notes (2010).
8 The Supreme Court has been famously preoccupied with class actions in recent
years, but even though settlement class actions are more common and more troubling,
every one of the Supreme Court’s recent cases involved a disputed class action rather than
a settlement class action. See, e.g., Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016) (involving
standing for a class action plaintiff); Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036
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to be ones in which defendants resist rather than embrace class certification.
But most class actions now are certified only for settlement, not for litigation.
Particularly when these undisputed class actions show up on a judge’s
docket—with the supposed adversaries hand-in-hand asking the judge to
bless their deal and thereby make it binding on the entire class—the judge
needs a keen awareness of how defendants and class counsel design settlements to serve their own interests.
The irony is that the seeds of disempowerment are sown by the very
mechanism that makes aggregation empowering for plaintiffs. Class certification and appointment of class counsel put power in the hands of class counsel over class members. Just as the separation of ownership and control
creates both opportunity and risk in the corporate context,9 so it does in
mass representation of plaintiffs.10 The plaintiffs own the claims but relinquish control to their lawyers, who represent a class of numerous similarly
(2016) (questioning whether plaintiffs may use statistical techniques to overcome individual issues and achieve class certification); Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663
(2016) (considering whether a defendant can moot litigation class action by offering class
representative complete individual relief); DirecTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463 (2015)
(considering whether consumers may litigate as a class notwithstanding an arbitration
clause class prohibition); Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014)
(involving fraud-on-the-market doctrine in securities class actions); Am. Express v. Italian
Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013) (questioning whether merchants could litigate antitrust claims as a class action notwithstanding arbitration clause class prohibition); Comcast
Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013) (involving proof requirements on motions to
litigate antitrust claims as class actions); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011)
(involving class certification for an employment discrimination class action); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepción, 563 U.S. 333 (2011) (considering whether consumers could litigate
fraud claims as a class action notwithstanding an arbitration clause class prohibition). Settlement class actions and settled litigation class actions could reach the Supreme Court on
objectors’ appeals. The problem is not lack of appealability, but rather that the Supreme
Court has shown little interest in controlling class actions as a tool for defendants’ closure
of liability, even as it has shown great interest in diminishing class actions as a tool for
plaintiffs’ empowerment.
9 See generally Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 301 (1983).
10 See AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 1.05(a)
reporters’ notes (2010) (“A foundational insight of the economic literature on agency relationships is that ownership of assets and control of their disposition must often be separated to achieve economies of scale, to take advantage of the division and specialization of
labor, to bear risks efficiently, and to realize other advantages. Equally basic, however, is
the understanding that when ownership and control of assets are divided, managers predictably lack incentives to maximize asset values and may even gain by acting to owners’
detriment.”); see also Martin H. Redish, Rethinking the Theory of the Class Action: The Risks and
Rewards of Capitalistic Socialism in the Litigation Process, 64 EMORY L.J. 451, 453 (2014) (offering a “guardianship model” of the class action in which virtually all of the power is held by
the class attorney, underscoring both the value of the device and the danger when attorneys’ profit incentives are misaligned with class members’ interests). Other scholars, by
contrast, embrace control by class counsel. See, e.g., Sergio J. Campos, Class Actions and
Justiciability, 66 FLA. L. REV. 553, 565–74 (2014) (largely embracing a “trustee” model of
class actions); Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Do Class Action Lawyers Make Too Little?, 158 U. PA. L.

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\92-2\NDL207.txt

2016]

unknown

Seq: 5

aggregation as disempowerment

19-JAN-17

7:50

863

situated clients. Control of numerous claims not only permits lawyers to
invest based on aggregate stakes, it also provides leverage at the negotiating
table because the lawyers can threaten substantial liability and offer substantial peace. Consolidation of control empowers claimants through their lawyers.11 But the consolidation of power in plaintiffs’ lawyers creates
opportunities for exploitation. Defendants negotiating multi-claimant settlements seek advantageous terms for themselves by offering attractive terms for
the plaintiffs’ lawyers.
Agency risks occur in every client-lawyer relationship, but they have
proved particularly problematic in mass settlement negotiations. I have
described elsewhere how some of these problems play out in non-class aggregate settlements, where leadership counsel in multidistrict litigation or lawyers engaged in mass collective representation sometimes use their power to
negotiate settlements on terms that are more favorable for defendants and
themselves than for their clients.12 The present Article focuses on class
action settlements both because they present the most extreme version of the
problem and because they offer the strongest opportunity for judicial
intervention.
The interests of defendants and of class action lawyers line up in important ways that do not match the interests of the class members. Both defendants and class counsel prefer to make settlements comprehensive—
defendants in order to strengthen protection from liability, and class counsel
in order to build fees. Class members, by contrast, might be better off retaining claims that are poorly compensated in the deal. Both defendants and
class counsel prefer to settle promptly to reduce litigation costs. Fees may
not fully reward class counsel for additional hours spent on litigation,13 and,
more to the point, they do not sufficiently reward the risk plaintiffs’ attorneys
incur if they fail to take the bird in hand. Class members may benefit by
holding out for a better deal, but the lawyers who control the negotiation do
REV. 2043, 2070 (2010) (arguing in favor of fee awards that fully incentivize class counsel to
pursue wrongdoers).
11 The focus is on class counsel rather than on class representatives because the lawyer
is where the power resides. See Issacharoff, supra note 7, at 354 (“To the extent that the
Rules direct courts to focus on the named class parties, they provide what is at best a
distraction from the real source of legitimacy in class actions: the incentives for faithful
representation by class counsel.”).
12 See Howard M. Erichson & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Consent Versus Closure, 96 CORNELL
L. REV. 265, 268 (2011); Howard M. Erichson, The Trouble with All-or-Nothing Settlements, 58
U. KAN. L. REV. 979, 1020–22 (2010) [hereinafter Erichson, All-or-Nothing]; Howard M.
Erichson, A Typology of Aggregate Settlements, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1769 (2005) [hereinafter Erichson, Typology].
13 Most courts award class counsel fees based on a percentage of the outcome,
although often they use the lodestar method (reasonable hourly fees multiplied by reasonable hours worked) as a crosscheck. The interests of defendants and of defendants’
outside litigation counsel diverge on the benefit of a prompt settlement, at least to the
extent the lawyers work on an hourly fee basis as opposed to a flat fee or alternative structure, but class counsel’s interests line up with the defendant itself.
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not fully internalize that benefit. Both a defendant and class counsel share
an interest in making a settlement appear larger to the judge than its true
value to class members or its true cost to the defendant, in order to secure
judicial approval of the settlement and fee. Finally, class counsel may trade
larger attorneys’ fees for smaller class recovery, permitting a defendant to
lower its overall settlement cost. These aligned interests explain why some
defendants negotiate fees with class counsel. They explain why some class
settlements include stunningly broad releases even when large swaths of
claimants get little or nothing of value. And they explain why some class
settlements include otherwise inexplicable remedies—illusory injunctive
relief, predictably unclaimed funds, non-transferable coupons, or off-point cy
pres awards—to create the illusion of value for the class.
Defendants, in short, have coopted the power of plaintiff aggregation.
They have learned how to buy res judicata on the cheap. Defendants and
their lawyers understand that aggregation puts control in the hands of plaintiffs’ lawyers rather than plaintiffs, and defendants and their lawyers know
that they have something of value to offer these plaintiffs’ lawyers in
exchange for advantageous settlement terms. In settlement, aggregation disempowers claimants by empowering their lawyers.
My point is not to disparage aggregation in general or class actions in
particular. Aggregate litigation remains as essential as ever for empowering
plaintiffs to pursue claims in mass disputes. Rather, my point is to show that
even as aggregation empowers claimants in litigation, it disempowers them in
settlement when courts look the other way as lawyers pursue self-interest at
the expense of client interests. When thinking about the resolution of mass
disputes, one is drawn to a tempting but inadequate syllogism: Aggregation is
good (and inevitable). Settlement is good (and inevitable). Therefore,
aggregate settlement is good (and inevitable). Each of the steps of this syllogism makes sense as far as it goes, but it stops short of the key point. Yes,
aggregation is essential for empowering claimants in mass disputes. Yes,
negotiated resolutions often are superior to adjudicated resolutions. And
yes, collective approaches to settlement in mass disputes make more sense
than independent individual settlements. But what the syllogism misses is
that there are many ways to resolve a mass dispute through collective litigation and negotiation, and some are better than others. Collective settlement
may be both inevitable and desirable as the endgame of mass disputes, but it
need not be so disempowering to claimants.
Part I of this Article traces the recent history of class actions and mass
litigation as a story of empowerment and disempowerment. Part II, the heart
of the Article, offers a catalogue of settlement features that harm class members while benefiting class counsel and defendants. First, it looks at five features that create an exaggerated appearance of value: spurious injunctive
relief, non-transferable and non-stackable coupons, unwarranted cy pres
remedies, unnecessary or burdensome claims procedures, and reversions.
Second, it looks at two features that expand class counsels’ franchise and
defendants’ protection: overbroad releases and expanded class definitions.
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Third, it looks at three terms that discourage objections: class representative
bonuses, revertible fee funds, and clear sailing agreements. Part III addresses
two important counterarguments. Finally, Part IV considers the problem
from both procedural and ethical perspectives and explains why the clearest
path to a solution lies in judicial recognition of problematic terms and judicial control of class settlements and class counsel fees.
I.

DEFENDANTS’ COOPTION
A.

OF THE

POWER

OF

AGGREGATION

A Brief History of Empowerment in Class Actions

To understand how defendants have coopted the power of aggregation—and how empowerment of claimants’ lawyers is not the same as
empowerment of claimants—it is helpful to place class action settlement
practice in historical context. Proponents of class actions have long justified
the procedure as empowering plaintiffs to pursue claims that could not be
pursued individually. When the modern class action rule was born in 1966,14
the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules justified Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 largely in terms of efficiency and consistency, but the empowerment
rationale came through in the superiority analysis where the Committee
noted, “the amounts at stake for individuals may be so small that separate
suits would be impracticable.”15 The Supreme Court in 1974 recognized that
for small claims, “[e]conomic reality dictates that petitioner’s suit proceed as
a class action or not at all.”16 In 1980, Chief Justice Warren Burger observed
that class actions fill the regulatory gap left open when government fails to
enforce the law:
The aggregation of individual claims in the context of a classwide suit is an
evolutionary response to the existence of injuries unremedied by the regulatory action of government. Where it is not economically feasible to obtain
relief within the traditional framework of a multiplicity of small individual
suits for damages, aggrieved persons may be without any effective redress
unless they may employ the class-action device.17
14 Rule 23 dates back to 1938 when the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure took effect,
and its roots can be traced much earlier. See 7A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE §§ 1751–53 (3d ed. 2016). The pre-1966 version, however, with its
“true,” “hybrid,” and “spurious” categories, proved difficult to apply. Id. § 1753. “Modern
Rule 23, which originated in 1966, was ‘a bold and well-intentioned attempt to encourage
more frequent use of class actions.’” Klonoff, supra note 6, at 736 (quoting Charles Alan
Wright, Class Actions, 47 F.R.D. 169, 170 (1970)).
15 FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note (1966 amendment); see also David Marcus, The History of the Modern Class Action, Part I: Sturm Und Drang, 1953–1980, 90 WASH.
U. L. REV. 587, 593 (2013).
16 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 161 (1974).
17 Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980); see also Phillips Petrol.
v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 809 (1985) (noting that class actions “permit the plaintiffs to pool
claims which would be uneconomical to litigate individually”). Professor John Coffee credits Kalven and Rosenfield with first recognizing “that the class action could be the procedural mechanism by which to arm and finance the private attorney general.” JOHN C. COFFEE,
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Not only could class actions help plaintiffs overcome the problem of negative-value suits for money damages, they allowed plaintiffs to overcome mootness problems and expanded opportunities for remedial action.
The first decade of post-1966 class actions included major cases on
school desegregation,18 voting rights,19 prison reform,20 and discrimination.21 Linda Mullenix describes this as “a period characterized by the emergence and domination of a new paradigm of public law and institutional
reform litigation,”22 alluding to Abram Chayes’s classic description of this
paradigm shift in The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation.23 Richard Marcus labels it the “heroic era” of litigation.24
Mass tort litigation emerged in earnest in the 1980s and presented different challenges than civil rights controversies. But one thing that mass
torts shared with civil rights was the use of class actions and other aggregative
procedures to empower plaintiffs.25 In the Agent Orange litigation—chronicled by Peter Schuck as a prototype of a new kind of litigation26—Judge Jack
Weinstein certified a class action and engineered a comprehensive resolution
to a politically charged controversy over chemical exposure during the Vietnam War.27 Some courts certified class actions in asbestos cases,28 although
for the most part asbestos litigation proceeded as masses of non-class lawsuits.
JR., ENTREPRENEURIAL LITIGATION 53–54 (2015) (citing Harry Kalven, Jr. & Maurice Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class Action Suit, 8 U. CHI. L. REV. 684 (1941)).
18 See, e.g., Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973); Hart v. Cmty. Sch. Bd. of
Educ., 383 F. Supp. 769 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), aff’d, 512 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1975); Vaughns v. Bd.
of Educ., 355 F. Supp. 1034 (D. Md. 1972); see also San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (involving a class action challenge to school financing system).
19 See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Hadnott v. Amos, 394 U.S. 358
(1969); Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969).
20 See, e.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972);
Inmates of Attica Corr. Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1973); Mead v. Parker,
464 F.2d 1108 (9th Cir. 1972); Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968); United
States v. Kahane, 396 F. Supp. 687 (E.D.N.Y. 1975); Wilson v. Beame, 380 F. Supp. 1232
(E.D.N.Y. 1974).
21 See, e.g., Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S 405 (1975); Morton v. Mancari,
417 U.S. 535 (1974); O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974); Newman v. Piggie Park
Enters., 390 U.S. 400 (1968); Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239 (3d Cir. 1975).
22 Linda S. Mullenix, Reflections of a Recovering Aggregationist, 15 NEV. L.J. 1455, 1457
(2014).
23 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976).
24 Richard Marcus, “Looking Backward” to 1938, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1691, 1698 (2014).
25 See Howard M. Erichson & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Lawyering for Groups: Civil Rights,
Mass Torts, and Everything in Between, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3039 (2013); Judith Resnik, From
“Cases” to “Litigation”, 54 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5 (1991).
26 See PETER SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MASS TOXIC DISASTERS IN THE COURTS 6
(1986).
27 See In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1267 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), aff’d,
818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987).
28 See, e.g., Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., 782 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1986); In re Sch. Asbestos
Litig., 789 F.2d 996 (3d Cir. 1986).
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Academics weighed in to promote class certification as a means of empowering plaintiffs to match the power of defendants in mass disputes.29
In the mid-1990s, however, appellate courts pushed back with a string of
reversals of class certifications,30 including the Fifth Circuit’s decertification
of a nationwide tobacco class action that presented the first serious litigation
threat to the cigarette industry.31 Mass litigation, however, did not dry up.
Judges and litigators found other mechanisms for aggregating mass litigation.32 Plaintiffs’ lawyers developed networks for representing large numbers
of similarly situated claimants. Mass collective representation of clients by a
single lawyer or firm, as well as coordination among plaintiffs’ law firms,
allowed plaintiffs’ lawyers to level the field against powerful defendants.33
Defendants, for their part, fought plaintiff aggregation at every turn.
They opposed class certification, opposed plaintiff party joinder, and
opposed consolidated trials. They eventually embraced certain methods for
aggregated processing such as federal Multidistrict Litigation (MDL), which
permits centralized handling of pretrial matters in federal court cases.34
MDL transfer made discovery less burdensome for defendants and tended to
slow the march toward trial. Methods for aggregated adjudication, however,
were anathema to defendants.35
Even as they fought plaintiffs’ efforts to litigate claims as class actions
and plaintiffs’ other attempts to try claims on a consolidated basis, defendants began looking for ways to resolve mass liability by negotiating global
settlements. The settlement class action, in particular, emerged as defendants’ preferred mechanism for resolving mass disputes.36 In a settlement
29 See, e.g., David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A “Public
Law” Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 849 (1984). Linda Mullenix calls the decade
from 1986 to 1996 “the first great age of aggregationist fervor.” Mullenix, supra note 22, at
1464.
30 See Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996) (tobacco litigation); In
re Am. Med. Syst., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069 (6th Cir. 1996) (penile implant litigation); In re
Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995) (blood products litigation).
31 Castano, 84 F.3d at 734.
32 See Thomas E. Willging & Emery G. Lee III, From Class Actions to Multidistrict Consolidations: Aggregate Mass-Tort Litigation After Ortiz, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 775 (2010); see also
Mullenix, supra note 22, at 1458 (noting that this era “marked the beginning of a long and
gradual shift in collective redress mechanisms away from the class action to alternative
forms of non-class aggregate litigation”).
33 Howard M. Erichson, Informal Aggregation: Procedural and Ethical Implications of Coordination Among Counsel in Related Lawsuits, 50 DUKE L.J. 381, 386–401 (2000).
34 See AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS, MASS TORT LITIGATION MANUAL § 2.01 (2006).
35 See id. In the words of one general counsel, “The class action device provides disproportionate leverage in favor of the plaintiffs’ attorney, which is why almost no class
actions ever get tried.” HENSLER ET AL., supra note 7, at 33 (quoting 2 Working Papers of
the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules on Proposed Amendments to Civil Rule 23, at 558,
559 (Admin. Off. of U.S. Courts, May 1, 1997) (written statement of William A.
Montgomery)).
36 See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 618 (1997) (“Among current
applications of Rule 23(b)(3), the ‘settlement only’ class has become a stock device.” (cit-
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class action, before class certification, the defendant negotiates a settlement
on a class-wide basis with putative class counsel. The defendant and putative
class counsel then present their deal to the court and jointly move for class
certification and for approval of the settlement.
The most prominent settlement class actions of the 1990s involved
efforts to resolve mature asbestos litigation.37 By then, asbestos litigation had
dragged on for years. When the litigation showed no signs of abating, asbestos defendants turned to settlement class actions as a way out of the morass.
The Supreme Court in 1997 rejected the attempt of a consortium of asbestos
defendants to use a settlement class action to resolve the future stream of
claims against them.38 And in 1999, the Supreme Court rejected Fibreboard
Corporation’s even more aggressive attempt to resolve future asbestos claims
through a limited fund settlement class action.39 Despite the setbacks of
Amchem and Ortiz, defendants did not give up on settlement class actions as a
tool for achieving global resolutions of mass disputes.
The early 2010s saw increased judicial resistance to class actions, especially at the Supreme Court. A five-Justice majority jumped at opportunities
to limit the class action as an empowerment tool for plaintiffs. The Court
rejected a gender-discrimination class action against the nation’s largest private employer, Wal-Mart,40 and reached out in that case to tighten the commonality requirement for class certification.41 In the Wal-Mart case, as well
as in an antitrust class action against Comcast Corporation, the Court raised
the proof requirements for class certification.42 The Court upheld class
action prohibitions in arbitration agreements, even if the prohibition would
be unenforceable as an unconscionable contract term under state law,43 and
even if a class action is the only realistic way for claimants to vindicate federal
statutory rights.44 Lower federal courts have applied these Supreme Court
ing T. WILLGING ET AL., EMPIRICAL STUDY OF CLASS ACTIONS IN FOUR FEDERAL DISTRICT
COURTS: FINAL REPORT TO THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 61–62 (1996))).
37 On the idea of mass tort maturity, see generally Francis McGovern, Resolving Mature
Mass Tort Litigation, 69 B.U. L. REV. 659 (1989).
38 See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 591.
39 See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999).
40 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011).
41 See id. at 347–51 (reaching a 5-4 decision on commonality despite the Court’s unanimous view that the Rule 23(b)(2) class action could not proceed because it sought nonincidental monetary relief).
42 See Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1432 (2013) (5-4 decision); WalMart, 564 U.S. at 352–53 (reaching a 5-4 decision on class certification proof requirements
despite unanimity that the class action could not proceed under Rule 23(b)(2)).
43 See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepción, 563 U.S. 333, 341 (2011) (5-4 decision).
44 Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2309–10 (2013) (5-3 decision with Justice Sotomayor not participating). The Court also has addressed attempts by
defendants to sidestep class actions by picking off named plaintiffs. Compare Genesis
Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 133 S. Ct. 1523, 1529 (2013) (reaching a 5-4 decision dismissing a Fair Labor Standards Act collective action for mootness after defendant made an
unaccepted offer of judgment for the full value of named plaintiff’s claim), with Campbell-
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pronouncements to restrict litigation class actions.45 And federal courts have
rigorously enforced the jurisdictional provisions of the Class Action Fairness
Act of 2005,46 a statute driven by distrust of class action lawyers and distrust
of certain state courts,47 making it difficult for plaintiffs to pursue sizable
class actions in state courts.
But even as courts have tightened restrictions on class certification for
litigation, they remain open to defendants’ use of class actions to achieve
binding resolutions through settlement. Looking at the Supreme Court’s
extraordinary run of anti-class-action decisions in recent years,48 notably
absent are any decisions imposing limits on settlement class actions.49 Some
courts have eased defendants’ path to getting released through settlement
class actions even where plaintiffs could not have gotten class actions certified for litigation.50 And district judges, predisposed to favor settlement and
unaccustomed to inquisitorial judging, have been too willing to approve
problematic class settlements.51
Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663 (2016) (rejecting such a pick-off in a Rule 23 class
action).
45 See Klonoff, supra note 6, at 823.
46 See, e.g., Pretka v. Kolter City Plaza II, Inc., 608 F.3d 744 (11th Cir. 2010); USW v.
Shell Oil Co., 602 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2010); Brill v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 427
F.3d 446 (7th Cir. 2005); see also Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Knowles, 133 S. Ct. 1345 (2013).
47 See Howard M. Erichson, CAFA’s Impact on Class Action Lawyers, 156 U. PENN. L. REV.
1593, 1596–602 (2008).
48 See, e.g., Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013); Am. Express Co., 133 S.
Ct. 2304; Symczyk, 133 S. Ct. 1523; Knowles, 133 S. Ct. 1345; Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,
564 U.S. 388 (2011); AT&T Mobility, 563 U.S. 333. But see Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John
Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014); Amgen, Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Tr. Funds, 133 S. Ct.
1184 (2013); Smith v. Bayer Corp., 564 U.S. 299 (2011); Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 563 U.S. 804 (2011).
49 The Supreme Court’s last two decisions restricting settlement class actions were in
the 1990s. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999); Amchem Prods., Inc. v.
Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997). In Amchem, the Court sent mixed signals about settlement
class actions. On the one hand, the Court affirmed the Third Circuit’s rejection of class
certification in that case, and stated that most of the Rule 23 requirements “demand undiluted, even heightened, attention in the settlement context.” Amchem, 521 U.S. at 620. On
the other hand, the Court stated that in a settlement class action, “a district court need not
inquire whether the case, if tried, would present intractable management problems.” Id.
Lawyers and judges have latched onto the latter dicta to promote settlement class actions.
50 See, e.g., In re Am. Int’l Group, Inc. Sec. Litig., 689 F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 2012); Sullivan
v. DB Invs., Inc., 667 F.3d 273 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc). See generally Howard M. Erichson,
The Problem of Settlement Class Actions, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 951 (2014).
51 See, e.g., Eubank v. Pella, 753 F.3d 718, 721 (7th Cir. 2014); In re Nat’l Football
League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 307 F.R.D. 351 (E.D. Pa. 2015); Redman v. RadioShack Corp., No. 11 C 6741, 2014 WL 497438 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 7, 2014), rev’d, 768 F.3d 622
(7th Cir. 2014); Pearson v. NBTY, No. 11 CV 7972, 2014 WL 30676 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 3, 2014),
rev’d, 772 F.3d 778 (7th Cir. 2014); In re EasySaver Rewards Litig., 921 F. Supp. 2d 1040
(S.D. Cal. 2013), vacated and remanded, 599 F. App’x 274 (9th Cir. 2015); In re DryMax
Pampers Litig., No. 1:10-cv-00301, 2011 WL 4502664 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 28, 2011), rev’d, 724
F.3d 713 (6th Cir. 2013); McDonough v. Toys “R” Us, Inc., 834 F. Supp. 2d 329 (E.D. Pa.
2011), rev’d, 708 F.3d 163 (3d Cir. 2013); Dennis v. Kellogg Co., No. 09-CV-1786, 2010 WL
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If class actions are to empower claimants, a turnaround is needed on two
fronts. On one side, empowerment demands that courts show less hostility to
litigation class actions, and on the other side, empowerment demands that
courts show more hostility to settlements that disserve class members.
B.

Recent Judicial Skepticism of Class Action Settlements

While some judges approve self-serving deals struck by class counsel and
defendants, a number of recent judicial decisions have looked at class settlements with a more jaundiced eye. They have struck down proposed settlements that provided little benefit to class members, advantageous terms for
defendants, and lucrative fees for counsel. These courts have done so, moreover, with blunt commentary on the incentives of class counsel and the
powerlessness of class members. It remains to be seen whether these recent
cases foretell a broader shift in judicial attitudes about class settlements, but
the time seems right. Alongside the disillusionment with aggregation that
increasingly appears in the academic literature,52 perhaps these rejections of
class settlements will influence others.
In Pearson v. NBTY,53 for example, the Seventh Circuit reversed a district
court’s approval of a settlement of false-labeling claims against Rexall and
other sellers of glucosamine pills. Judge Richard Posner’s opinion explained
the problems with the proposed labeling changes, the claims process, and
other remedies, but the opinion did not merely point out the inadequacy of
the settlement.54 Rather, the opinion spoke directly to the motives of the
defendant and of class counsel:
It’s hard to resist the inference that Rexall was trying to minimize the number of claims that class members would file, in order to minimize the cost of
the settlement to it. Class counsel also benefited from minimization of the
4285011 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2010), rev’d, 697 F.3d 858 (9th Cir. 2012); Lane v. Facebook,
No. C 08-3845, 2010 WL 9013059 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2010), aff’d, 696 F.3d 811 (9th Cir.
2012), reh’g en banc denied, 709 F.3d 791 (9th Cir. 2013); Nachshin v. AOL, LLC, No. 2:09cv-03568 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 31, 2009), rev’d, 663 F.3d 1034 (9th Cir. 2011); Hayden v. Elf
Atochem N. Am., Inc., No. 4:92-cv-01054 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 14, 2003), rev’d sub nom. Klier v.
Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc., 658 F.3d 468 (5th Cir. 2011).
52 See, e.g., Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Disaggregation, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 667 (2013);
Jaime Dodge, Disaggregative Mechanisms: Mass Claims Resolution Without Class Actions, 63
EMORY L.J. 1253 (2014); Mullenix, supra note 22; see also MARTIN H. REDISH, WHOLESALE
JUSTICE: CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF THE CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT
(2009). From the comparative perspective, even as the world generally moves toward more
liberal procedures for group litigation, it does not look kindly on U.S. class action settlements. See CHRISTOPHER HODGES & ASTRID STADLER, RESOLVING MASS DISPUTES: ADR AND
SETTLEMENT OF MASS CLAIMS 8 (2013) (“The history of the US class action is full of examples of suspicious settlements with the group members left behind with dubious ‘discount
coupons’ instead of money damage awards or cy-près solutions granting only indirect benefit to the class or consumers in general.”).
53 772 F.3d 778 (7th Cir. 2014). For discussion of particular features of the glucosamine settlement, see infra text accompanying notes 76–87, 126, and 172–76.
54 See Pearson, 772 F.3d at 785–87.
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claims, because the fewer the claims, the more money Rexall would be willing to give class counsel to induce settlement.55

Importantly, the court did not use the language of collusion. Rather, it
used the language of self-interest.56 The fruitful question, Judge Posner
understood, is not whether there was a nefarious conspiracy between the
defendant and class counsel. Rather, looking at the actual terms of the settlement, the question is whether class counsel negotiated in the best interests of
the class, as opposed to negotiating a deal that would appeal to the defendant, appear satisfactory to an uninquisitive judge, and serve class counsel’s
self-interest.57
Similarly, in a settlement class action concerning Kellogg’s marketing of
Frosted Mini-Wheats, the Ninth Circuit spoke of the risk that “the incentives
favoring pursuit of self-interest rather than the class’s interests in fact influenced the outcome of the negotiations.”58 After examining specific features
such as the cy pres remedy and injunctive relief of questionable value to the
class, Judge Stephen Trott’s opinion asked whether there was any explanation, other than self-interest, for the “mysteries” in the settlement: “Neither
class counsel nor Kellogg offers any credible reason for the mysteries in the
current settlement. To approve this settlement despite its opacity would be
to abdicate our responsibility to be ‘particularly vigilant’ of pre-certification
class action settlements.”59
The court questioned not only the compensatory value of the settlement
to the class of consumers, but also the settlement’s cost to the defendant and
thus its value in terms of disgorgement and deterrence:
Moreover, Plaintiffs’ counsel tells us that settlements like this serve the purposes of “restitutionary disgorgement and deterrence.” If the product cy pres
distribution is form over substance and not worth nearly as much to Kellogg
as the settlement claims, then these goals are not served. To the contrary,
the settlement is a paper tiger.60

The court’s insistence on looking at the real value of the settlement to the
class, its inquiry as to the cost of the settlement to the defendant, and its
55 Id. at 783; see also In re Walgreen Co. Stockholder Litig., No. 15-3799, 2016 WL
4207962 at *3 (7th Cir. Aug. 10, 2016) (Posner, J.) (“The type of class action illustrated by
this case—the class action that yields fees for class counsel and nothing for the class—is no
better than a racket. It must end. No class action settlement that yields zero benefits for
the class should be approved, and a class action that seeks only worthless benefits for the
class should be dismissed out of hand.”).
56 See Pearson, 772 F.3d at 787.
57 See Erichson, supra note 50, at 962 (citing cases approving settlements because of
the lack of evidence of “collusion” and arguing that this is the wrong question).
58 Dennis v. Kellogg Corp., 697 F.3d 858, 867 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Staton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 960 (9th Cir. 2003)). For discussion of the cy pres aspect of the
Kellogg settlement, see infra text accompanying notes 142–50.
59 Id. (quoting In re Bluetooth Headset Prods. Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 935, 947 (9th Cir.
2011)).
60 Id. at 868.
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related consideration of class counsel’s self-interest should be a model for
other courts.
The most noteworthy progress on this front has occurred in the courts
of appeals. For its part, the twenty-first century Supreme Court61 has shown
little interest in the dangers of class actions as a tool for defendants to escape
liability through favorable settlements, even as it has gone out of its way to
restrict class actions as a tool for plaintiffs to pursue their claims through
litigation. The one notable exception is Chief Justice Roberts’s statement
respecting the denial of certiorari in Marek v. Lane,62 which involved a settlement that protected Facebook from liability for claims that its Beacon program violated members’ privacy rights. The settlement survived review by the
district judge and by the Ninth Circuit.63 When the petition reached the
Supreme Court, the Chief Justice criticized the deal despite his agreement
with the Court’s denial of certiorari. Running down the list of problems—
spurious injunctive relief, inappropriate cy pres remedy, and self-serving
expansion of the settlement class by the defendant and class counsel—he
framed the deal as a low-cost strategy for Facebook to insulate itself from
liability:
In the end, the vast majority of Beacon’s victims got neither [money
damages nor an injunction barring Facebook from continuing the program]. The named plaintiffs reached a settlement agreement with the
defendants before class certification. Although Facebook promised to discontinue the “Beacon” program itself, plaintiffs’ counsel conceded at the
fairness hearing in the District Court that nothing in the settlement would
preclude Facebook from reinstituting the same program with a new name.
And while Facebook also agreed to pay $9.5 million, the parties allocated that fund in an unusual way. Plaintiffs’ counsel were awarded nearly a
quarter of the fund in fees and costs, while the named plaintiffs received
modest incentive payments. The unnamed class members, by contrast,
received no damages from the remaining $6.5 million. Instead, the parties
earmarked that sum for a “cy pres” remedy—an “as near as” form of relief—
because distributing the $6.5 million among the large number of class members would result in too small an award per person to bother. The cy pres
remedy agreed to by the parties entailed the establishment of a new charitable foundation that would help fund organizations dedicated to educating
the public about online privacy. A Facebook representative would be one of
the three members of the new foundation’s board.
To top it off, the parties agreed to expand the settlement class barred
from future litigation to include not just those individuals injured by Beacon
during the brief period in which it was an opt-out program—the class pro61 The Supreme Court has not examined the problems of settlement class actions or
inadequate class settlements since Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997), and
Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999). See supra note 49.
62 134 S. Ct. 8 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., respecting denial of certiorari). For discussion of
particular features of the Facebook settlement, see infra text accompanying notes 88–94,
151–65, and 196–200.
63 Id. at 9.
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posed in the original complaint—but also those injured after Facebook had
changed the program’s default setting to opt in. Facebook thus insulated
itself from all class claims arising from the Beacon episode by paying plaintiffs’ counsel and the named plaintiffs some $3 million and spending $6.5
million to set up a foundation in which it would play a major role.64

The statement ended with the reasons why he did not consider the
Facebook case a suitable vehicle for addressing questions about cy pres remedies in class actions, as well as his view that “[i]n a suitable case, this Court
may need to clarify the limits on the use of such remedies.”65 One can hope
that the Court will address not only the issue of cy pres remedies as the Chief
Justice suggests, but also the broader problem of settlements that serve class
counsel and defendants but not class members, and that the Court will do it
with the sensitivity shown by the Ninth Circuit in Dennis v. Kellogg and the
Seventh Circuit in Pearson v. NBTY.
II.

RED FLAGS

IN

CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS

What features of class settlements benefit defendants and plaintiffs’ lawyers without providing value to class members? This Part looks at ten features of problematic class settlements: spurious injunctive relief, nontransferable or non-stackable coupons, unjustified cy pres remedies, burdensome or unnecessary claims procedures, reversions, excessively broad
releases, expanded class definitions, class representative bonuses, revertible
fee funds, and clear sailing agreements. The first five features involve efforts
to make a settlement appear larger than it is. The next two features address
breadth—breadth of claims and breadth of class definition—and have a common goal of expanding class counsel’s franchise and the defendant’s protection from liability. The final three features are terms that discourage
objections to a settlement or to class counsel’s fee request.
The point of cataloguing these settlement features and reporting examples is twofold. The first purpose is explanatory and evidential. The clearest
way to tell the story of aggregation as disempowerment is by showing what it
looks like in actual settlement terms. The evidence of the phenomenon is
the very existence of settlement features that serve defendants and class
counsel without benefiting class members. This catalogue and these examples of course do not establish that all class settlements are problematic, but
they suffice to show that the problem is real.
The second purpose is more action-oriented and is directed both at
judges and at lawyers negotiating class settlements. By pointing out settlement features that fail to serve class members, the Article aims to help judges
identify settlements that warrant closer scrutiny or outright rejection. And by
encouraging judges to scrutinize settlements with these features, the Article
aims to steer lawyers away from including such terms in class settlements.
64
65

Id. at 8–9 (citation omitted).
Id. at 9.
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Terms That Create an Exaggerated Appearance of Value

Regardless of a settlement’s true value to class members, and regardless
of a settlement’s true cost to a defendant, the defendant and class counsel
share an interest in making the settlement appear as large as possible. The
more valuable the settlement appears to the judge, the more likely the judge
will find it “fair, reasonable, and adequate” for purposes of judicial
approval.66 And the bigger the settlement, the bigger the fee for class counsel. This Section considers five types of settlement terms that bulk up the
apparent size of settlements at low cost to defendants and with little value for
class members.
1.

Spurious Injunctive Relief

Class actions can provide an effective means of obtaining injunctive remedies. Whether as primary relief in Rule 23(b)(2) class actions or as secondary relief in Rule 23(b)(3) class actions, class plaintiffs often seek structural
reform or other changes in defendant conduct.67 Discrimination plaintiffs
want the defendant to stop discriminating. Consumer fraud plaintiffs want
the defendant to stop defrauding. Prison reform plaintiffs want prison
reform. Product liability plaintiffs want the defendant to stop producing a
dangerous product or, in some cases, to provide better warnings. For a court
to include injunctive remedies in such cases, whether by adjudication or by
settlement approval, makes sense as long as the change in defendant’s conduct accomplishes something to remedy the problems raised in the complaint. Class settlements can be a superb way to protect rights and effect
institutional reform.
Some class settlements, however, incorporate meaningless changes in
defendant’s conduct. In such settlements, the defendant agrees to do something that costs the defendant little and does little for the class. By creating
the illusion that the settlement accomplishes something, the defendant
hopes for res judicata through judicial approval of the deal. Likewise, by
creating the illusion of accomplishment, the class lawyer hopes to obtain judicial approval not only of the settlement but also of the lawyer’s fee request.68
66 FED R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2).
67 See, e.g., Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (class action seeking changes to
college admissions policy); Parsons v. Ryan, 754 F.3d 657 (9th Cir. 2014) (class action seeking changes to prison medical care system); Bates v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 511 F.3d 974
(9th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (class action seeking changes to employment policy for hearingimpaired drivers); see also Settlement Agreement, Peoples v. Fischer, No. 11-cv-2694
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2015) (proposed class settlement altering New York’s policies concerning solitary confinement).
68 See Theodore H. Frank, Position Paper for Roundtable on Settlement Class Actions
¶ 1.5.3 (Apr. 8, 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (“When courts hold
that class counsel is entitled to fees for creating prospective injunctive relief of uncertain
benefit, the incentive of class counsel and defendants is not to optimize social good (much
less the benefit to the class), but to reshuffle deck chairs to minimize pain to the defendant
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Consider, for example, Poertner v. Gillette Co.,69 a recently affirmed settlement class action involving Duracell batteries. Plaintiffs claimed that Gillette
falsely marketed its Duracell Ultra Advanced and Ultra Power batteries as
longer lasting than its standard Duracell CopperTop batteries.70 As part of
the settlement, “Gillette agreed to stop putting the allegedly misleading statements on the packaging of Ultra batteries.”71 But by the time Gillette agreed
to the settlement, it had discontinued the Ultra line of batteries.72 Simply
put, the company agreed to a labeling change on a product that it no longer
manufactured, marketed, or sold. When the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the
approval of the settlement, it did not find clearly erroneous the district
judge’s finding that the class received a “substantial benefit” from the company’s agreement to refrain from labeling Ultra batteries as longer-lasting.73
The Court of Appeals reasoned, “Gillette’s decision to stop selling and marketing Ultra batteries with the challenged statements on the packaging was
motivated by the present litigation.”74 But the fact that litigation motivated a
company to alter its conduct does not make the change itself consideration
for the class members’ release of their claims. The Duracell settlement also
included a cy pres remedy (distribution of batteries to charitable organizations), a small cash component available on a claims-made basis (the total
amount paid was $344,850), and attorneys’ fees and costs of $5.68 million.75
Class counsel, incredibly, contended that a $5-million fee was justified
because it was only ten percent of the settlement’s stated $50-million value.76
Pearson v. NBTY77 offers another example of a consumer class settlement
with a meaningless labeling change. Plaintiffs sued Rexall and other sellers
of glucosamine pills, alleging that the defendants falsely represented that
their product protected cartilage.78 The defendants negotiated a settlement
class action that, appropriately for a false-labeling class action, included
changes to the product’s labeling.79 However, the label changes required by
the settlement were temporary in duration and cosmetic in content.80 The
district court in Pearson approved the settlement but attributed zero value to
while justifying fees to class counsel, at the expense of the class’s original claims and often
society at large.”).
69 618 F. App’x 624 (11th Cir. 2015). The case offered the Supreme Court an excellent opportunity to weigh in on class settlement remedies, but the Court denied certiorari.
See Frank v. Poertner, 136 S. Ct. 1453 (2016) (mem.) (denying certiorari).
70 See Poertner, 618 F. App’x at 625.
71 Id. at 626.
72 Id. at 625.
73 Id. at 629.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 625–26.
76 See id. at 626.
77 772 F.3d 778 (7th Cir. 2014). For discussion of the Seventh Circuit’s decision in
Pearson, see supra text accompanying notes 53–56.
78 See Pearson, 772 F.3d at 779.
79 Id. at 779, 784.
80 Id. at 784.

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\92-2\NDL207.txt

876

unknown

Seq: 18

notre dame law review

19-JAN-17

7:50

[vol. 92:2

the label revisions.81 The Seventh Circuit went further, reversing the settlement approval as an abuse of discretion.82 The injunctive relief was one of
many problems with the settlement, but the Court of Appeals took pains to
describe its valuelessness.83 First, the court highlighted the limited time
frame of the relief. The packaging restrictions applied for only two years
(although the settlement described a thirty-month restriction, it gave the
defendants six months to effectuate the changes).84 The Seventh Circuit
wondered why a settlement of false-labeling claims would permit a defendant
to restore the alleged misrepresentations:
The 30-month (actually 24-month) cutoff means that after 30 months Rexall
can restore the product claims that form the foundation of this suit. It says it
will be reluctant to do that because then fresh class actions will be brought
against it. But if so, why would it prefer a 30-month injunction to a perpetual injunction?85

The Seventh Circuit’s bigger concern, however, was the injunction’s substantive emptiness:
A larger objection to the injunction is that it’s superfluous—or even
adverse to consumers. Given the emphasis that class counsel place on the
fraudulent character of Rexall’s claims, Rexall might have an incentive even
without an injunction to change them. The injunction actually gives it protection by allowing it, with a judicial imprimatur (because it’s part of a settlement approved by the district court), to preserve the substance of the claims
by making—as we’re about to see—purely cosmetic changes in wording,
which Rexall in effect is seeking judicial approval of. For the injunction
seems substantively empty.86

The court examined, one by one, the packaging changes required by the
settlement. For each, the court said, “We see no substantive change.”87 And
the court went on:
Equally dubious claims found on the original label, moreover, are left
unchanged, such as “maintain healthy connective tissue,” “lubricate joints,”
“maintain joint comfort,” and “improvements to joint comfort in seven
days.” . . . And no medical basis is suggested for any of the changes, or for
not making changes that would bite.88
81 Pearson v. NBTY, Inc., No. 11 CV 7972, 2014 WL 30676 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 3, 2014), rev’d
on other grounds, 772 F.3d 778 (7th Cir. 2014).
82 See Pearson, 772 F.3d at 787.
83 See id.
84 Id.
85 Id. at 785.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id. Similarly, in the antitrust setting, a judge recently rejected a major settlement
class action while expressing concerns about the “questionable value” of the injunctive
relief provided in the proposed settlement. See In re Am. Express Anti-Steering Rules Antitrust Litig., Nos. 11-MD-2221, 13-CV-7355, 2015 WL 4645240, at *20 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 4,
2015).
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In Lane v. Facebook,89 plaintiffs challenged Facebook’s “Beacon” program
under which information about members’ non-Facebook Internet activities
was broadcast without their affirmative consent. Plaintiffs contended that the
program violated their privacy rights.90 Facebook negotiated a settlement
class action in which the company agreed to terminate Beacon, but could
reinstate the same policies.91 The district judge approved the settlement,
and the Ninth Circuit affirmed.92 The Supreme Court denied certiorari, but
as discussed above,93 Chief Justice Roberts wrote separately to comment on
the problems with the settlement. He noted that although the “complaint
sought damages and various forms of equitable relief, including an injunction barring the defendants from continuing the program,” the victims did
not get either of the forms of relief they sought.94 As to injunctive relief, he
pointed out the emptiness of the settlement: “Although Facebook promised
to discontinue the ‘Beacon’ program itself, plaintiffs’ counsel conceded at
the fairness hearing in the District Court that nothing in the settlement
would preclude Facebook from reinstituting the same program with a new
name.”95
Merger and acquisition litigation sometimes yields nuisance settlements
in which corporations agree to meaningless supplemental disclosures in
exchange for release from class claims.96 The Delaware Chancery Court
recently rejected such a disclosure-only settlement of claims involving a proposed merger of Trulia and Zillow.97 The Chancellor wrote:
I conclude that the terms of this proposed settlement are not fair or reasonable because none of the supplemental disclosures were material or even
helpful to Trulia’s stockholders, and thus the proposed settlement does not
afford them any meaningful consideration to warrant providing a release of
claims to the defendants.98

Similarly, the Seventh Circuit recently reversed a district court’s approval
of a disclosure-only settlement relating to a Walgreens acquisition and reor89 696 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2012).
90 Id. at 816.
91 Id. at 828. The settlement also included a cy pres component of dubious value,
which will be discussed below, and several million dollars in fees for the class lawyers. See
infra text accompanying notes 151–65.
92 See Lane, 696 F.3d at 826.
93 See supra text accompanying notes 62–64.
94 Marek v. Lane, 134 S. Ct. 8, 8 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., respecting denial of certiorari).
95 Id. The Chief Justice quoted the transcript from the fairness hearing: “At the end of
the day, we could not reach agreement with defendants regarding limiting their future
actions as a corporation.” Id.
96 See Jill E. Fisch et al., Confronting the Peppercorn Settlement in Merger Litigation: An
Empirical Analysis and a Proposal for Reform, 93 TEX. L. REV. 557 (2015); Joel Edan Friedlander, How Rural/Metro Exposed the Systemic Problem of Disclosure Settlements, 40 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 877 (2016); Sean J. Griffith, Correcting Corporate Benefit: How to Fix Shareholder Litigation by Shifting the Doctrine on Fees, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1 (2015).
97 See In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 908 (Del. Ch. 2016).
98 Id. at 887.
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ganization.99 Judge Posner’s opinion examined, one by one, each of the disclosures that class counsel had obtained in exchange for a release of the class
members’ claims, and explained why not one of them contained any new
information that a reasonable investor would have found significant.100
The lesson from these examples is that courts must not assume all negotiated remedies have value. The fact that class counsel and the defendant
struck a deal with an injunctive component does not necessarily indicate that
the injunctive remedy accomplishes anything useful. When thinking about
settlement approval or attorneys’ fees, courts should ask whether non-monetary components of a class settlement—structural reforms, marketing revisions, added disclosures, promises regarding conduct, and so on—provide
any value to the class members, or, for that matter, whether the reforms cost
anything to the defendant. If the non-monetary remedies provide real value,
then courts should take that value into account for settlement approval and
fees. Rexall’s label revisions in Pearson, Facebook’s new institute in Lane, and
Trulia’s supplemental disclosures in its merger litigation provided nothing of
value to class members. Moreover, the measures were virtually costless and
arguably beneficial to the defendants.
2.

Coupons

In class action settlements, defendants naturally prefer providing coupons or credits to paying cash. Not only do coupons cost less to the defendant, they may help the defendant to generate business. In theory, there is
nothing wrong with coupon settlements.101 At their best, coupons or credits
present opportunities for non-zero-sum gains in settlement by providing
value to class members greater than the cost to defendants. The best coupons or credits are transferable, stackable, and unrestricted.102 In practice,
99 See In re Walgreen Co. Stockholder Litig., No. 15-3799, 2016 WL 4207962 (7th Cir.
Aug. 10, 2016).
100 See id. at *2–3.
101 For a defense of coupon settlements, see Michael W. Davis et al., Coupon Settlements
Play Continuing Role in Class Litigation After CAFA, 13 CLASS ACTION LITIG. REP. (BNA) No.
14, at 811 (July 27, 2012).
102 See, e.g., Young v. Polo Retail, LLC, No. C-02-4546, 2007 WL 951821 (N.D. Cal. Mar.
28, 2007). In Young, the court approved a class action settlement that was part cash, part
gift cards. Judge Vaughn Walker explained why he approved it despite misgivings, focusing on the gift cards’ breadth and transferability:
The primary downside of the proposed settlement is the use of product
vouchers in the settlement award. The federal rules instruct that “[s]ettlements
involving nonmonetary provisions for class members . . . deserve careful scrutiny
to ensure that these provisions have actual value to the class.” Advisory Committee note for FRCP 23(2)(C)(h). In its preliminary approval order, the court
asked “why would former employees, who allegedly were forced to buy a great
deal of unwanted Polo products, desire product vouchers so that they could
purchase even more clothes?” In response, plaintiff notes that Polo sells a broad
array of merchandise other than clothes, such as sheets, towels, perfume and
paint. More compelling than the availability of alternative items like Polo brand
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however, coupon settlements sometimes provide little benefit to class
members.
Coupons or credits that are transferable, especially if they permit a secondary market in the coupons, have cash value. If coupons are not transferable, one has to ask, Why not? To whatever extent the purpose of the
settlement is to compensate class members for their claims, why aren’t they
entitled to the value of the coupon? And to whatever extent the purpose of
the settlement is disgorgement and deterrence, shouldn’t the defendant
absorb the cost of the coupon regardless of whether a class member personally redeems it? Non-transferability increases the likelihood that a coupon
will neither provide any benefit to the class member nor impose any cost on
the defendant. If a settlement includes non-transferable coupons or credits,
it is hard to resist the conclusion that the defendant wanted to discourage
class members from using them, and that class counsel acquiesced because
the coupons or credits would give the settlement a large face value even if the
remedy provided little value to class members.
Another red flag is non-stackability. The holder of the coupon or credit
should be able to use it on top of other discounts or credits. If coupons are
not stackable, again one has to ask, Why not? To whatever extent the purpose of the settlement is to compensate class members for their claims,
shouldn’t they be entitled to the value of the coupon on top of whatever
other discounts or credits they might have? And to whatever extent the purpose of the settlement is disgorgement and deterrence, shouldn’t the defendant absorb the cost of the coupon regardless of whether a class member has
other credits to use? When businesses use coupons, credits, or discounts as
marketing devices, they are free to impose whatever restrictions they think
will maximize profits. But when class counsel negotiate with defendants for
coupons or credits as an alternative to cash in the settlement of plaintiffs’
claims, it is hard to see a justification for non-stackability. If the defendant’s
business strategy for some reason requires that settlement coupons or credits
not be used on top of other coupons or credits, then the lawyers and judge
should be clear about the fact that the coupons or credits are worth less than
their face value.
A third red flag is undue restrictions on use. For example, if a coupon
or credit has an expiration date, or may be used only on certain items or only
during certain calendar windows, then one ought to ask why such a restriction makes sense as part of the settlement. Unlike non-transferability and
paint or perfume is the transferability of the gift cards; this enables class members
to obtain cash—something all class members will find useful.
Id. at *4 (alterations in original) (citations omitted); see also In re Auction Houses Antitrust
Litig., 164 F. Supp. 2d 345 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d, 42 F. App’x 511 (2d Cir. 2002) (approving an antitrust class action settlement in which class counsel took fees in the same 80-20
proportion of cash and coupons as class members, coupons were redeemable for cash after
five years, and the settlement provided for the development of a secondary market in the
coupons). See generally Christopher R. Leslie, A Market-Based Approach to Coupon Settlements
in Antitrust and Consumer Class Actions, 49 UCLA L. REV. 991 (2002).
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non-stackability, which seem intended only to reduce the cost to the defendant while creating the illusion of value for the class, certain restrictions on
use may help parties achieve non-zero-sum gains in settlement. If so, the
parties ought to be able to explain why the restrictions were useful in achieving a positive result for the class, and ought to be clear about the extent to
which the restrictions reduce the actual value of the coupons or credits. If
the coupons are transferrable and give rise to a secondary market, then
restrictions on use are less problematic because the actual value of the deal
for purposes of awarding attorneys’ fees may be determined by the amount
others are willing to pay for the coupons notwithstanding the restrictions on
use.
Problems of non-transferability, non-stackability, and restricted use often
go hand in hand. For example, Hewlett Packard (HP) agreed to settle claims
involving HP InkJet printers by providing up to $5 million in “e-credits”
redeemable for printers and printer supplies, making certain disclosures to
consumers, and paying up to $2.9 million in attorneys’ fees and costs.103
Class members would receive electronic credits for $2, $5, or $6 for each
affected HP printer. The coupons, which could be used only on HP’s website
and would expire in six months, were not transferable and could not be used
with other discounts or coupons.104 The district court approved the settlement and awarded attorneys’ fees of $1.5 million plus nearly $600,000 in
costs.105 The Ninth Circuit did not reach the question of whether the district
court abused its discretion in finding the settlement reasonable, but reversed
on the grounds that the district court’s fee award to class counsel violated the
Class Action Fairness Act, which requires that fees for coupon settlements be
based on the value of coupons actually redeemed.106
In In re EasySaver Rewards Litigation,107 the defendant settled claims by
providing class members with $20 credits for online purchases from
ProFlowers and the defendant’s other online gift-selling businesses. The
credits could not be used during the Christmas, Valentine’s Day, or Mother’s
Day seasons; they expired in one year; and they could not be used on top of
the substantial discounts that the website regularly offered all its customers.108 The parties audaciously asked the court to value these credits at their
full face value, and the district judge complied.109 The judge approved the
settlement and awarded attorneys’ fees based on the total face value of the
103 See In re HP InkJet Printer Litig., 716 F.3d 1173, 1176 (9th Cir. 2013).
104 See id. at 1176 & n.2; see also id. at 1179 (“[A] coupon settlement is likely to provide
less value to class members if, like here, the coupons are non-transferable, expire soon
after their issuance, and cannot be aggregated.”).
105 Id. at 1177.
106 Id. at 1181, 1187 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1712 (2012)).
107 921 F. Supp. 2d 1040 (S.D. Cal. 2013), vacated and remanded, 599 F. App’x 274 (9th
Cir. 2015).
108 See id. at 1045.
109 Id. at 1048–49 (“[T]he Court finds that the $20 credits, regardless of their classification as coupons or credits, provide an actual value of $20 to the class members despite the
blackout dates and inability to combine the credits with coupons and promotions.”).
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deal, including both the coupon component and the cash component,
despite overwhelming reasons why each of the components was actually
worth far less than the face value. The court stated, “The total settlement will
approximate $38 million dollars if the entire class use the credits and make
claims for reimbursement.”110 But predictably only a small fraction of the
class members would use the credits and make claims for reimbursement, so
it is hard to understand how class counsel could straight-facedly ask a judge
to treat the remedy as being worth its face value, or how a district judge could
agree to do so.
Section 1712 of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA) took aim
at coupon settlements.111 The statute, best known for expanding federal
court jurisdiction over class actions, allows federal courts to approve a coupon settlement only upon a hearing and a written finding that the settlement
is reasonable for class members.112 Moreover, in cases where a judge awards
attorneys’ fees based on the size of the settlement, the statute instructs judges
to consider the value to class members of coupons actually redeemed.113
Although CAFA too narrowly focused on “coupons” rather than the full panoply of class settlement issues, section 1712 is a useful tool for courts inclined
to invoke it.114 The Senate Report captured the skepticism courts should
bring to coupon settlements:
Such settlements may be appropriate where they provide real benefits to
consumer class members (e.g., where coupons entitle class members to
receive something of actual value free of charge) or where the claims being
resolved appear to be of marginal merit. However, where such settlements
are used, the fairness of the settlement should be seriously questioned by the
reviewing court where the attorneys’ fees demand is disproportionate to the
level of tangible, non-speculative benefit to the class members.115

110 Id. at 1046.
111 See 28 U.S.C. § 1712; S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 27 (2005).
112 28 U.S.C. § 1712(e) (“In a proposed settlement under which class members would
be awarded coupons, the court may approve the proposed settlement only after a hearing
to determine whether, and making a written finding that, the settlement is fair, reasonable,
and adequate for class members.”); see also S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 31 (“Section 1712(e)
provides that a federal judge may not approve a coupon settlement without first conducting a hearing and determining that the settlement terms are fair, reasonable, and
adequate for class members. In making that determination, the judge should consider,
among other things, the real monetary value and likely utilization rate of the coupons
provided by the settlement.”).
113 28 U.S.C. § 1712(a) (“If a proposed settlement in a class action provides for a recovery of coupons to a class member, the portion of any attorney’s fee award to class counsel
that is attributable to the award of the coupons shall be based on the value to class members of the coupons that are redeemed.”). The statute does not prohibit use of a lodestar
method rather than a percent-of-recovery method, however. See id. § 1712(b).
114 See, e.g., Redman v. RadioShack Corp., 768 F.3d 622, 633–34 (7th Cir. 2014).
115 S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 31–32.
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But questions persist about what counts as a “coupon” under the statute,116
and parties continue to negotiate settlements with significant components of
coupons, vouchers, or credits.
Regardless of whether they use the word coupon, courts should be on
the lookout for any settlement that offers a credit or discount for goods or
services. When a class settlement includes such a provision, the judge should
ask whether the credit or discount is transferrable, stackable, and
unrestricted. Valuation of such settlement terms for purposes of approving
the settlement or awarding attorneys’ fees should be based on the actual
value to the class members of credits or discounts redeemed.117
3.

Cy Pres

It has become common for class settlements to include payments to
charitable organizations.118 The theory behind such “cy pres” settlement
provisions is that even if a settlement cannot feasibly compensate class members directly, it can remedy the claims indirectly through an organization
that serves similar interests.
Short for cy près comme possible (as close as possible), an equitable doctrine that permits the effectuation of a testator’s intent by finding the next
best thing to satisfy the intent when the testator’s specific instructions cannot
be followed, cy pres has proved useful in certain class actions where direct
remedies are elusive.119 An early example is Daar v. Yellow Cab Co.,120 a California class action in which plaintiffs claimed that a taxicab company had
been overcharging its customers for four years. Well before the era of Uber
accounts and credit card taxi payments, it was not feasible to identify and
locate customers who had used the defendant’s cabs during the relevant time
frame. The parties reached a $1.4-million settlement in which $950,000
would be funded by requiring the defendant to lower its fares for a period of
time, thus spreading the remedy to future users of the company’s services.121
Although the remedy was overinclusive and underinclusive in terms of whom
it compensated, it was the most sensible remedy for the class of taxicab customers under the circumstances. Presumably there would be overlap
116 See, e.g., In re Online DVD-Rental Antitrust Litig., 779 F.3d 914 (9th Cir. 2015). The
district court in EasySaver, for example, concluded that the online credits in that class
settlement were not “coupons” for purposes of CAFA. In re EasySaver Rewards Litig., 921
F. Supp. 2d 1040 (S.D. Cal. 2013), vacated, 599 F. App’x 274 (9th Cir. 2015).
117 To the extent class actions serve goals of deterrence and disgorgement rather than
compensation, valuation may be based on cost to defendant rather than value to class
members. Either way, non-transferability, non-stackability, and use restrictions reduce the
value of credits or discounts as class action remedies. See infra text accompanying notes
120–26.
118 See Wasserman, supra note 5.
119 Beck & Weil, supra note 5, at 1–2.
120 Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 433 P.2d 732 (Cal. 1967).
121 See 4 ALBA CONTE & HERBERT B. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 11:20 n.13
(4th ed. 2002).

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\92-2\NDL207.txt

2016]

unknown

Seq: 25

aggregation as disempowerment

19-JAN-17

7:50

883

between the set of past customers who were overcharged and the set of future
customers who would receive the lower fares, and even if not, at least the
defendant would give up its ill-gotten gains.122
Another early example is the Agent Orange class action settlement, in
which three-fourths of the settlement fund was set aside for distribution on a
claims-made basis to Vietnam veterans who were diagnosed with cancer during the designated time frame, and one-fourth was used to create a “Class
Assistance Program” to serve the needs of Vietnam veterans and their families. Judge Jack Weinstein explained this portion of the settlement as a way
to reach a broader portion of the class than would be eligible for cash
payments.123
But cy pres remedies have spread to a wider range of class settlements,
and the distributions do not always make sense as remedies for the claims
asserted by the class. Courts should be on the lookout for three types of red
flags: cy pres remedies in settlements where class members could have been
compensated directly, cy pres remedies that flow to organizations with which
class counsel or the judge is affiliated, and cy pres remedies that fail to benefit class members or that serve the defendant’s self-interest.
Cy pres remedies in settlements make sense under some limited circumstances, particularly to distribute settlement funds that remain after fully
compensating all class members who can be located. Reversion and escheat
are worse options for remainders.124 The American Law Institute, in the
Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation, recommends distribution of
remaining funds to identified class members instead of cy pres distribution.125 Cy pres remedies should remain available as a tool in the class settle122 Some would refer to the remedy in Daar as “fluid recovery” rather than cy pres:
As the term has been most often used, cy pres refers to the designation of a portion of unclaimed damage or settlement funds to a charitable use that is in some
way related to the subject of the suit. As employed here, fluid class recovery
applies to an effort—either in a class settlement or as part of a class award—to
approximate the injured class of consumers through the provision of relief to
future consumers.
Redish et al., supra note 5, at 662. Both types of remedies are built on the idea that even if
class members cannot be compensated directly, it may be possible to remedy their claims
indirectly. The settlement provisions of this sort that raise red flags involve cy pres more
than fluid recovery.
123 See In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 689 F. Supp. 1250, 1259–60 (E.D.N.Y.
1988).
124 Reversion to the defendant undermines deterrence. See infra text accompanying
notes 158–59. Escheat to the state takes class members’ claims and appropriates their
value as public property. See Highland Homes Ltd. v. Texas, 448 S.W.3d 403 (Tex. 2013)
(holding that unclaimed class action funds need not escheat to the state under the Texas
Unclaimed Property Act, despite prior Texas decisions to the contrary).
125 See, e.g., AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 3.07
(2010). In some cases a second distribution may create a windfall for a small minority of
class members while leaving other class members’ claims completely unremedied, but in
general section 3.07 represents a sensible approach to the problem of cy pres, and courts
increasingly are moving to this position. See, e.g., In re BankAmerica Corp. Secs. Litig., 775
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ment toolbox, but courts should be on the lookout for the red flags that
suggest that the inclusion of a cy pres remedy worked to advantage class
counsel and the defendant at the expense of class members.
a.

Unnecessary Cy Pres

The most basic red flag is the unnecessary inclusion of a cy pres remedy.
The very presence of cy pres relief in a settlement should make a judge ask
whether compensating the class directly was truly infeasible.
In Pearson v. NBTY, Inc., the case concerning false labeling of glucosamine, the district court approved a settlement class action that included a
$1.13-million cy pres award to an orthopedic foundation.126 The Seventh
Circuit held that cy pres was improper because the funds should have gone
to class members:
[T]here is no validity to the $1.13 million cy pres award in this case. A cy pres
award is supposed to be limited to money that can’t feasibly be awarded to
the intended beneficiaries, here consisting of the class members . . . . The
Orthopedic Research and Education Foundation seems perfectly reputable,
but it is entitled to receive money intended to compensate victims of consumer fraud only if it’s infeasible to provide that compensation to the victims—which has not been demonstrated.127

The point is simple: unless it is infeasible to remedy claims directly, there is
no cause to resort to an “as close as possible” solution.128
In In re BankAmerica Corp. Securities Litigation,129 shareholders filed class
actions alleging securities law violations in connection with the merger of
NationsBank and BankAmerica to form Bank of America Corporation. The
court certified four classes and later approved a class settlement.130 After two
rounds of distributions to class members, $2.4 million remained in a settlement fund for the NationsBank class.131 Granting class counsel’s motion to
distribute the “surplus settlement funds” to charity, the district court ordered
“that the balance of the NationsBank Classes settlement fund shall be distributed cy pres to Legal Services of Eastern Missouri, Inc.”132 A class representaF.3d 1060 (8th Cir. 2015); Klier v. Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc., 658 F.3d 468 (5th Cir. 2011);
Slipchenko v. Brunel Energy, Inc., No. H-11-1465, 2015 WL 5332219 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 14,
2015); Better v. YRC Worldwide Inc., No. 11-2072, 2013 WL 4482922 (D. Kan. Aug. 19,
2013).
126 Pearson v. NBTY, Inc., 772 F.3d 778, 780 (7th Cir. 2014).
127 Id. at 784.
128 See ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, supra note 5, at 27 (“The starting point is that
the settlement funds belong to the class members and do not serve as a resource for general ‘public interest’ activities overseen or endorsed by the court.”).
129 775 F.3d 1060.
130 Id. at 1062.
131 Id. at 1069.
132 In re Bank of Am. Corp. Secs. Litig., No. 4:99-MD-1264, 2013 WL 3212514, at *7
(E.D. Mo. June 24, 2013), rev’d sub nom. In re BankAmerica Corp. Secs. Litig., 775 F.3d 1060
(8th Cir. 2015).
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tive argued on appeal that the district court abused its discretion in ordering
the cy pres distribution, and the Eighth Circuit agreed.133 The Court of
Appeals did not accept class counsel’s word that a cy pres distribution was
warranted, since further distributions to the class were feasible. The court
emphatically rejected class counsel’s contention “that a further distribution
to the class is inappropriate because it would primarily benefit large institutional investors, who are less worthy than charities such as [the proposed cy
pres beneficiaries].”134 The Eighth Circuit “flatly reject[ed] this contention,”
calling the move an “impermissible misappropriation of monies gathered to
settle complex disputes among private parties.”135
What the district courts in Pearson and BankAmerica failed to appreciate
is that the claims belong to the class members. As the Eighth Circuit aptly
put it in BankAmerica, giving settlement funds to charity, when the funds
could be distributed to class members, amounts to misappropriation of other
people’s money.
b.

Cy Pres Tainted by Conflict of Interest

The ugliest cy pres settlements are those that direct funds to organizations with which class counsel or the judge is affiliated. In a particularly egregious example, a settlement in the fen-phen mass tort litigation included a cy
pres component in which the defendant paid $20 million to establish the
“Kentucky Fund for Healthy Living,” and the proceeds were used in part to
pay an annual salary to the judge and to the plaintiffs’ lawyers as directors of
the new organization.136 The lawyers involved were disbarred,137 two were
convicted on criminal charges,138 and the judge was removed from the
bench.139
Most examples are not so corrupt, but nonetheless may involve settlements that steer money in a direction that an attorney or judge favors. In
selecting cy pres recipients, negotiators may seek to benefit their alma maters
or their favorite charities.140 By letting the judge select cy pres recipients,
negotiators may seek to incline the judge toward approval without adding
value for the class.141 A variation is allowing class representatives to select the
charities, which is a way to incline the class representatives to go along with
133 BankAmerica, 775 F.3d at 1062–63.
134 Id. at 1065.
135 Id.
136 Gallion v. Ky. Bar Ass’n, 266 S.W.3d 802, 804 (Ky. 2008).
137 Cunningham v. Ky. Bar Ass’n, 266 S.W.3d 808, 813 (Ky. 2008); Gallion, 266 S.W.3d
802, 807.
138 United States v. Cunningham, 679 F.3d 355, 369 (6th Cir. 2012); see also Erichson,
All-or-Nothing, supra note 12, at 986.
139 Ky. Bar Ass’n v. Bamberger, 354 S.W.3d 576, 580 (Ky. 2011).
140 See, e.g., In re EasySaver Rewards Litig., 921 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1045 (S.D. Cal. 2013),
vacated, 599 F. App’x 274 (9th Cir. 2015).
141 See, e.g., In re Baby Prods. Antitrust Litig., 708 F.3d 163 (3d Cir. 2013).
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the proposed settlement regardless of what it accomplishes for the class.142
Courts should be skeptical about any settlement term that primarily appeals
to the lawyers’, class representatives’, or judge’s self-interests—including
their altruistic interests.
c.

Cy Pres of No Value to the Class

Finally, courts should be wary of cy pres settlement provisions that are
worthless for class members, self-serving for defendants, or both. The point
of a cy pres remedy is not to find a random organization that does worthwhile work; the point is to achieve the best remedy for claimants that can be
achieved under circumstances where direct compensation is infeasible. If a
judge and lawyers want to help a worthy organization, they are free to donate
their own money; they are not free to donate other people’s claims.
In Dennis v. Kellogg Co.,143 the plaintiff filed a class action claiming that
Kellogg engaged in a false marketing campaign asserting that its Frosted
Mini-Wheats cereal was scientifically proven to improve children’s cognitive
functions for several hours after breakfast.144 The class lawyers negotiated a
deal with Kellogg to settle the claims on a nationwide basis through a settlement class action. The largest component of the settlement was Kellogg’s
agreement to distribute $5.5 million of Kellogg food items to charities that
feed the indigent.145 In addition, $2.75 million would be set aside for distribution to class members on a claims-made basis, and any remainder of this
fund would be donated to “charities chosen by the parties and approved by
the Court pursuant to the cy pres doctrine.”146
The district court approved the Kellogg settlement along with $2 million
in fees and costs for class counsel.147 The Ninth Circuit, reversing, noted
that the noble goal of feeding the needy has nothing to do with the class of
plaintiffs or the purpose of the lawsuit, other than that they both involve
food.148 The court questioned the value of the settlement for the class mem142 See Nachshin v. AOL, LLC, 663 F.3d 1034, 1037 (9th Cir. 2011) (involving a settlement where class representatives each chose a charity to receive $8750; one chose the
school where she worked).
143 Dennis v. Kellogg Co., 697 F.3d 858 (9th Cir. 2012).
144 Id. at 861–62.
145 Id. at 863 (“Kellogg agreed to distribute, also pursuant to the cy pres doctrine, $5.5
million ‘worth’ of specific Kellogg food items to charities that feed the indigent. The settlement does not specify the recipient charities, nor does it indicate how this $5.5 million
in food will be valued—at cost, wholesale, retail, or by some other measure.”).
146 Id. at 862–63. The settlement also included a marketing restriction of dubious
value. For three years, Kellogg would “refrain from using in its advertising and on its labeling for the Product any assertion to the effect that ‘eating a bowl of Kellogg’s® Frosted
Mini-Wheats cereal for breakfast is clinically shown to improve attentiveness by nearly
20%,’” but the company “would still be allowed to claim that ‘[c]linical studies have shown
that kids who eat a filling breakfast like Frosted Mini-Wheats have an 11% better attentiveness in school than kids who skip breakfast.’” Id. at 863 (alteration in original).
147 Id.
148 Id. at 866.
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bers: “This record leaves open the distinct possibility that the asserted $5.5
million value of the product cy pres award and the remaining cash cy pres
award will only be of serendipitous value to the class purportedly protected
by the settlement.”149 Not only did the court suggest that the cy pres remedy
was worthless to the class, the court went further, asking whether the remedy
was designed to be costless to Kellogg:
[T]he settlement fails to include any restrictions on how Kellogg accounts
for the cy pres distributions. Can Kellogg use the value of the distributions as
tax deductions because they will go to charity? And given that Kellogg
already donates both food and money to charities every year—which is
unquestionably an admirable act—will the cy pres distributions be in addition
to that which Kellogg has already obligated itself to donate, or can Kellogg
use previously budgeted funds or surplus production to offset its settlement
obligations?150

The court also raised questions about the valuation of the cy pres remedy,
appropriately worrying that the proposed food distribution was a ploy to
make the settlement appear large for purposes of justifying the attorneys’
sizable fee request.151
149 Id. at 867. For another example of an off-point cy pres settlement remedy, see In re
BankAmerica Corp. Secs. Litig., 775 F.3d 1060 (8th Cir. 2015), which involved alleged
violations of securities laws in connection with the merger of NationsBank and BankAmerica to form Bank of America Corporation. After initial distribution to class members, $2.4
million remained in a settlement fund for the NationsBank class. The district court, at
class counsel’s suggestion, ordered “that the balance of the NationsBank Classes settlement
fund shall be distributed cy pres to the Legal Services of Eastern Missouri, Inc.” In re Bank
of Am. Corp. Secs. Litig., No. 4:99-MD-1264, 2013 WL 3212514, at *7 (E.D. Mo. June 24,
2013), rev’d sub nom. BankAmerica, 775 F.3d 1060. Reversing, the Eighth Circuit stated that
Legal Services of Eastern Missouri, “though unquestionably a worthy charity, is not the
‘next best’ recipient of unclaimed settlement funds in this nationwide class action seeking
damages for violations of federal and state securities laws.” BankAmerica, 775 F.3d at 1067.
150 Dennis, 697 F.3d at 867–68. After the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s
approval of the settlement, Kellogg negotiated a new settlement with class counsel. The
revised deal increased the cash payment to class members. It still included a cy pres component, but rather than distribute food and funds to organizations that feed the indigent,
the settlement designated specific consumer advocacy groups as the recipients of funds.
Dennis v. Kellogg Co., No. 09-CV-1786, 2013 WL 1883071, at *1 (S.D. Cal. May 3, 2013).
151 The court explained that the appropriateness of the requested fees for class counsel
depended upon valuing the food distribution at the full stated amount of $5.5 million,
even though the parties did not specify whether the valuation was based on retail price,
wholesale price, producer’s cost, or some other measure:
This deficiency raises in turn serious issues about the alleged dollar value of
the product cy pres award, an important number used to measure the appropriateness of attorneys’ fees. For example, if the alleged $5.5 million value of the product cy pres distribution turns out on close examination to be an illusion and is
subtracted from the alleged $10.64 million value of the common fund, the dollar
value of the settlement fund plummets to $5.14 million, and the $2 million attorneys’ fees award becomes 38.9% of the total, which is clearly excessive under our
guidelines. This possibility gives us an additional reason to be vigilant regarding
the particulars of this class action settlement: is it all that it appears to be? Are the
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In Lane v. Facebook, Inc.,152 discussed above in the context of spurious
injunctive relief,153 plaintiffs challenged Facebook’s Beacon program as an
invasion of privacy for broadcasting members’ online activities without consent.154 The named plaintiff, Sean Lane, had bought a ring from Overstock
.com as a Christmas gift for his wife, and his wife learned of the purchase
when Facebook revealed the information without Lane’s consent.155
Facebook and the class action lawyers struck a deal. Facebook agreed to terminate Beacon, but could reinstate the same program by a different
name.156 Facebook also agreed to pay $9.5 million, but none of the money
would go to class members.157 Rather, about $3 million would go to the class
lawyers and class representatives and $6.5 million would be used to create an
organization called the Digital Trust Foundation (DTF),158 whose purpose
was to “fund and sponsor programs designed to educate users, regulators[,]
and enterprises regarding critical issues relating to protection of identity and
personal information online through user control, and the protection of
users from online threats.”159 The foundation would have a three-member
board of directors, one of whom would be a Facebook executive.160 The
district court approved the settlement,161 the Ninth Circuit affirmed162 and
denied rehearing en banc,163 and the Supreme Court denied certiorari.164
The Facebook settlement traded away class members’ claims for something of no value to the class. The class did not get protection from the
alleged privacy violations because the settlement permitted Facebook to reinstate the same policies. The class did not receive any compensation. And as
to the cy pres remedy, not only would Facebook partly control the new entity,
but the entity was not even devoted to serving the interests at stake in the
lawsuit. The DTF was established to enhance user control through educaassigned numbers real, or not? This issue is particularly critical with a cy pres
product settlement that has a tenuous relationship to the class allegedly damaged
by the conduct in question. The issue of the valuation of this aspect of a settlement must be examined with great care to eliminate the possibility that it serves
only the “self-interests” of the attorneys and the parties, and not the class, by
assigning a dollar number to the fund that is fictitious.
Dennis, 697 F.3d at 868.
152 Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 696 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2012).
153 See supra text accompanying notes 75–78.
154 Lane, 696 F.3d at 817.
155 Id. at 827 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
156 Id. at 828.
157 Id. at 817 (majority opinion).
158 Id.
159 Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting DIGITAL TR.
FOUND., http://digitaltrustfoundation.org/purpose-history/ (last visited Sept. 30, 2016)).
160 Id.
161 Id. at 818; see also Lane v. Facebook, Inc., No. C 08-3845, 2010 WL 9013059 (N.D.
Cal. Mar. 17, 2010).
162 Lane, 696 F.3d at 826.
163 Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 709 F.3d 791, 793 (9th Cir. 2013).
164 Marek v. Lane, 134 S. Ct. 8 (2013).
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tion, but the lawsuit had nothing to do with protection from hackers or accidental disclosure of private information by users. Rather, the lawsuit accused
Facebook of intentionally (and wrongfully) revealing user information.
Judge Smith explained the disconnect in his dissent from the Ninth Circuit’s
denial of rehearing en banc:
[A]n organization that focuses on protecting privacy solely through “user
control” can never prevent unauthorized access or disclosure of private information where the alleged wrongdoer already has unfettered access to a user’s
records. The DTF can teach Facebook users how to create strong passwords,
tinker with their privacy settings, and generally be more cautious online, but
it can’t teach users how to protect themselves from Facebook’s deliberate
misconduct. Unless of course the DTF teaches Facebook users not to use
Facebook. That seems unlikely.165

The Facebook settlement was lambasted166 but the deal survived.
4.

Claims Procedures

To obtain money from a settlement fund, class members often must participate in a post-settlement claims process. The first question should be
whether any claims process is necessary. Could the settlement compensate
class members directly rather than on a claims-made basis? Defendants often
possess information about their own consumers, members, investors, or
employees. If class members can be identified using information in defendants’ possession, and if settlement amounts need not vary individually based
on information unavailable to defendants, then the settlement should set up
a direct payment process rather than a claims-made process. In a settlement
of price-fixing claims against electronic book publishers, for example, the
defendant publishers funded automatic credits to class members’ Amazon
accounts.167 In a recent study of consumer class action compensation rates,
Brian Fitzpatrick and Robert Gilbert showed that settlements can be
designed to increase the proportion of class members who actually receive
compensation.168 They found not only that the settlements with the highest
compensation rates did not require class members to file claim forms, but
also that where checks were automatically sent to class members, the check
negotiation rate depended upon whether postcard-sized checks or standardsized checks were used,169 and they concluded that “courts and counsel inter165 Lane, 709 F.3d at 794–95 (Smith, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
166 See, e.g., Liptak, When Lawyers, supra note 5.
167 In re Elec. Books Antitrust Litig., No. 12-cv-03394, 2013 WL 7045299 (S.D.N.Y. Dec.
9, 2013); see also For Information About the 2016 Apple eBook Settlement, AMAZON, http://www
.amazon.com/gp/feature.html?docId=1002402851 (last visited Dec. 15, 2016) (“Eligible
customers do not need to do anything to receive these credits. If you are eligible, we have
already calculated your credit and added it to your Amazon account.”).
168 See Brian T. Fitzpatrick & Robert C. Gilbert, An Empirical Look at Compensation in
Consumer Class Actions, 11 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 767, 788 (2015).
169 Id. at 770.
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ested in the compensatory side of class actions should make efforts to directly
deposit settlement payments whenever possible.”170
The second question, assuming a claims process is needed, is whether
the process established by the settlement is more opaque or burdensome
than necessary.171 Claims rates in class actions are often low, an unsurprising
fact given the small amounts often involved. Compensation in small-claims
class actions requires clear, concise notice and simple, efficient claiming. But
defendants naturally prefer to pay less and class counsel have little incentive
to push for a simpler claims process if they can persuade a court to award
fees based on the total available fund. In this regard, claims-made cash settlements have much in common with the coupon settlements discussed
above.172
The glucosamine false labeling settlement in Pearson v. NBTY, for example, included monetary compensation to be provided on a claims-made basis,
as well as a cy pres remedy. The Seventh Circuit, explaining its rejection of
the cy pres component of the settlement, noted that rather than paying out
claims only on a claims-made basis, the defendant could have sent checks to
those customers whom it knew to have bought the pills:
The 4.72 million who received postcards were all those whom Rexall knew
(through pharmacy loyalty programs and the like) to have bought its glucosamine pills . . . . [K]nowing that 4.72 million people had bought at least one
bottle of its pills, Rexall could have mailed $3 checks to all 4.72 million postcard recipients.173

As to the portion of the settlement that provided monetary compensation to class members, the Seventh Circuit described the discouraging claims
process:
Another of the links is captioned “Claim Form,” and if you clicked on that
you’d see a “Glucosamine Settlement Claim Form.” The form required the
claimant to list cash register receipts or other documentation indicating the
date and place at which he or she had bought the product. The form
advised the claimant that “The Claims Administrator and the Parties have
the right to audit all claims for completeness, waste, fraud, and abuse. Filing
a false claim may violate certain criminal or civil laws.” Further, the claimant
was—in boldface—required to “certify under penalty of perjury that the
foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge.”174
170 Id. at 771.
171 See ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, supra note 5, at 26 (“In reviewing a proposed
settlement, the court should focus on whether the claims process might be too demanding,
deterring or leading to denial of valid claims.”).
172 See Frank, supra note 68, ¶ 1.5.2 (“Claims-made settlements . . . are economically
indistinguishable from coupon settlements. In both types of settlements, the defendant
‘makes available’ a certain amount of relief, but can expect to pay only a fraction of that
amount because of low redemption or claims rates.”). For a discussion of red flags in
coupon settlements, see supra subsection II.A.2.
173 Pearson v. NBTY, Inc., 772 F.3d 778, 784 (7th Cir. 2014).
174 Id. at 783.
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The court suggested that a sworn statement should have sufficed for monetary compensation in light of the low ceiling on payouts and the fact that
claimants were unlikely to have kept receipts.
The requirement of needlessly elaborate documentation, the threats of criminal prosecution, and the fact that a claimant might feel obliged to wade
through the five other documents accessible from the opening screen of the
website, help to explain why so few recipients of the postcard notice bothered to submit a claim.175

What motivated the defendant to make the claims process complex and
intimidating? The court found it “hard to resist the inference” that the goal
was to minimize the number of claims.176 And why would class counsel agree
to such a claims process? The court explained it, correctly and troublingly,
in terms of class counsel’s interest in reducing the payouts to class members:
“Class counsel also benefited from minimization of the claims, because the
fewer the claims, the more money Rexall would be willing to give class counsel to induce settlement.”177 As long as they can make the settlement appear
large for purposes of settlement approval and attorneys’ fees, the defendant
and class counsel share an interest in creating a burdensome claims process
that reduces the number of claims.
The EasySaver Rewards Litigation class settlement included not only
restricted coupons,178 but also a process for class members to obtain cash
refunds of their monthly membership fees in the rewards program. To
obtain refunds, class members were required to visit an online link and submit their contact information.179 But the defendant already knew who had
paid the membership fees and how much they had paid. Indeed, the settlement required that refund claims be evaluated based on the defendant’s own
records: “The Claims Administrator will evaluate and calculate all claims for
payment based upon Defendants’ records.”180 Why would a refund process
place the burden on each class member to reach out to the company? Class
members were required to “verify that they did not intend to enroll and did
not use the benefits of the program.”181 While verification processes can be
useful to separate meritorious from non-meritorious claims, the step was
problematic in this settlement given the nature of the claims in the EasySaver
litigation. The plaintiffs’ lawsuit accused the defendant of fraudulently enticing consumers to click on a link to earn rewards from the defendant’s online
businesses.182 One might expect this class of consumers, burned once, to
175 Id.
176 Id.
177 Id.
178 For a discussion of the EasySaver settlement as an example of an unduly restrictive
coupon settlement, see supra text accompanying notes 107–10.
179 In re EasySaver Rewards Litig., 921 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1045 (S.D. Cal. 2013), vacated,
599 F. App’x 274 (9th Cir. 2015).
180 Id.
181 Id.
182 Id. at 1043.
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resist clicking on another link from the same company and to provide
requested information. Given that the defendant could have sent each customer a refund check, one has to wonder whether the refund process was
designed to maximize the margin between the stated value of the settlement
(for purposes of settlement approval and attorneys’ fees) and the actual cost
of the settlement to the defendant.
5.

Reversions and Claims-Made Settlements

Reversionary settlements seem to have become uncommon in the face of
judicial disfavor.183 When a class settlement provides for the reversion of
unclaimed funds to the defendant, it encourages the defendant and class
counsel to design a claims process that reduces the compensation actually
paid to the class while leaving the defendant and class counsel a basis for
overstating the value of the settlement for purposes of settlement approval
and attorneys’ fees. As mentioned above, there is no perfect answer to what
should happen to money that remains in a fixed-amount settlement fund
after class members’ claims have been paid.184 Reversion to the defendant
reduces the impact of the class action both as a matter of compensation and
as a matter of deterrence and disgorgement. Cy pres distribution carries its
own problems. Escheat eliminates the under-enforcement problem of reversion but deprives class members of a portion of their compensation for the
claims that they gave up. The American Law Institute recommends a second
distribution to class members, when feasible, if funds remain after a first distribution,185 but in some cases such a distribution would provide a windfall
for a small number of class members while leaving others uncompensated.
The problems with reversion would disappear if attorneys’ fees were
awarded based on funds actually paid to class members, rather than based on
the face value of the settlement as presented by its proponents. If fees are to
be awarded based on the entire settlement fund, judges should be wary of
approving any class settlement that allows funds to revert to the
defendant.186
183 See, e.g., In re Baby Prods. Antitrust Litig., 708 F.3d 163, 172 (3d Cir. 2013) (“Reversion to the defendant risks undermining the deterrent effect of class actions by rewarding
defendants for the failure of class members to collect their share of the settlement.”); In re
Lupron Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 677 F.3d 21, 32–33 (1st Cir. 2012); Six (6) Mexican
Workers v. Ariz. Citrus Growers, 904 F.2d 1301, 1308–09 (9th Cir. 1990); Diamond Chem.
Co. v. Akzo Nobel Chems. B.V., 517 F. Supp. 2d 212 (D.D.C. 2007); Cundiff v. Verizon Cal.,
Inc., 84 Cal. Rptr. 3d 377 (Ct. App. 2008).
184 See supra text accompanying notes 103–04.
185 AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 3.07(b) (2010).
186 See ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, supra note 5, at 26 n.37. The report suggests
that it might be beneficial for the Committee to add language to the Rule 23 notes to
express caution about settlements with reversionary provisions, for example by saying that
“if there is a reverter clause the court should look at the claims process very carefully to
make sure that it does not impose high barriers to claiming.” Id.
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In terms of discouraging the design of user-friendly claims processes,
claims-made settlements are no different from reversionary settlements. A
claims-made settlement is one in which the defendant pays claimants as they
come rather than paying a set amount of money into a settlement fund.187
B.

Terms That Expand Class Counsels’ Franchise and Defendants’ Protection

Defendants’ interests and plaintiffs’ lawyers’ interests align in settlement
comprehensiveness. When a defendant pays to be released from claims, the
defendant desires the broadest possible release, preferring to be thoroughly
shielded from future litigation. Claimants who get little from the settlement
might benefit from a narrower release that leaves their claims intact, but the
negotiating lawyer has the opposite objective, as class action lawyers seek to
expand the size of their franchise. The broader the class definition at settlement, the more claimants the attorney represents. And the broader the
release, the more a defendant is willing to pay, even if the benefit is negligible for each added member of a more broadly defined class.
1.

Excessively Broad Release

A settlement, by definition, means that a claimant releases claims in
exchange for the remedy offered by the defendant. But the releases in some
class settlements go further than one would expect, releasing defendants
from liability for conduct that falls outside of the claims asserted in the complaint. It is easy to understand why a defendant would request an all-encompassing release, but it is harder to see why a loyal negotiator for the class
would agree to it. One might expect that a lawyer negotiating on behalf of a
plaintiff class would push back against a defendant’s unduly broad proposed
release.
The best deal for the class would be one that releases only those claims
that are reasonably compensated in the settlement. For the class lawyer, however, it is hard to internalize the benefit to the class that flows from a narrower release. The lawyer stands to benefit only from the particular class
settlement on the table, not from whatever judgment or settlement the class
members might obtain in a subsequent action upon other claims. Thus, the
class lawyer’s self-interest points toward accepting whatever release the defendant demands. For the class lawyer, anything that expands the scope of the
deal, and anything that gets the deal done, is advantageous. Releasing additional claims may be costly to class members, but it is costless to their lawyer.
In Authors Guild v. Google Inc.,188 for example, Google and a group of
class action lawyers proposed a settlement class action that not only would
have released Google from liability to authors for past copyright infringe187 See RUBENSTEIN, supra note 1, § 13:7 (defining claims-made settlement and describing it as “the functional equivalent of a common fund settlement where the unclaimed
funds revert to the defendant”).
188 Authors Guild v. Google Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). Judge Denny
Chin rejected the proposed class settlement and later granted summary judgment in favor
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ment in connection with its controversial Google Books project, but also
would have released Google from liability for future conduct in connection
with the project. For Google, the benefit of such a release was obvious. By
striking a deal with lawyers who purport to represent all book authors,
Google sought to protect itself from copyright liability as it moved forward
with its controversial project. For the lawyers who purported to represent the
class, the benefit was equally obvious, as the settlement provided that Google
would pay the lawyers $30 million.189 Judge Chin concluded that the futureconduct aspect of the settlement was an improper “attempt to use the class
action mechanism to implement forward-looking business arrangements that
go far beyond the dispute before the Court in this litigation.”190 Class members, the court observed, “would be giving up certain property rights in their
creative works, and . . . would be deemed—by their silence—to have granted
to Google a license to future use of their copyrighted works.”191
In In re Payment Card Interchange Fee & Merchant Discount Antitrust Litigation, which involved antitrust claims by merchants against Visa and MasterCard, Judge Pierre Leval eloquently captured the confiscatory aspect of
certain class settlements. The Second Circuit had reversed the district
court’s certification and approval of a pair of settlement class actions in
which an opt-out settlement class would get monetary relief while a non-optout settlement class would get only injunctive relief.192 Judge Leval agreed
with the majority that the class was inadequately represented, but he wrote
separately to emphasize the mismatch between certain class members’ benefit and the release the defendants would have received:
What is particularly troublesome is that the broad release of the Defendants binds not only members of the Plaintiff class who receive compensation
as part of the deal, but also binds in perpetuity, without opportunity to reject
the settlement, all merchants who in the future will accept Visa and MasterCard, including those not yet in existence, who will never receive any part of
the money. This is not a settlement; it is a confiscation. . . . One class of
Plaintiffs receives money as compensation for the Defendants’ arguable past
violations, and in return gives up the future rights of others.193
of Google, which the Second Circuit affirmed. Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., 954 F.
Supp. 2d 282 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), aff’d, 804 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2015).
189 Amended Settlement Agreement at 80, Authors Guild v. Google Inc., 770 F. Supp.
2d 666 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 05-cv-08136).
190 Authors Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 677 (quoting Statement of Interest of the United
States of America Regarding Proposed Amended Settlement Agreement at 2, Authors
Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d 666).
191 Id. at 680; see also James Grimmelmann, Future Conduct and the Limits of Class-Action
Settlements, 91 N.C. L. REV. 387 (2013). For an analysis of similar problems with a large
antitrust class action settlement, see Steven Semeraro, Settlement Without Consent: Assessing
the Credit Card Merchant Fee Class Action, 2015 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 186.
192 In re Payment Card Interchange Fee & Merch. Disc. Antitrust Litig., 827 F.3d 223,
240 (2d Cir. 2016).
193 Id. at 241 (Leval, J., concurring).
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For class counsel, it is costless and potentially very profitable to trade
away the future rights of those not at the table. A broadly defined class and a
broadly framed release give the defendant maximal protection from liability;
the question for the court must be whether all of the class members are adequately compensated for giving up their right to sue.
2.

Expanded Class Definition

Class action requires class definition.194 Binding nonparties—the very
essence of a class action—demands some way to know who is bound.195 Class
definitions may be struck at varying levels of inclusiveness. Is it a class only of
current employees or does it include former employees? What are the dates
and other parameters for a class of investors? What products or services are
included for a class of consumers? Is the class limited to those whose contract took a particular form? In a discrimination class action, what groups are
included? In a class action for injuries attributed to product exposure, is the
class limited to those whose injuries have manifested or does it include all
who have been exposed? Is it a statewide, nationwide, or otherwise geographically defined class?
A defendant’s preference for a narrow or broad class definition depends
on whether the class action is being defined for purposes of litigation or
settlement. When class actions are to be litigated, defendants generally prefer narrower class definitions. The bigger the class, the bigger the exposure.
In settlement, however, defendants prefer the broadest class definition they
can obtain for a reasonable price. The defendant, after all, is paying for res
judicata. When a court enters judgment approving a class settlement, every
class member is precluded from pursuing the claim against the defendant.196
The more claim preclusion the defendant can get for its settlement dollars,
the happier the defendant.
When it comes to defining a settlement class expansively, class counsel
have no incentive to resist a defendant’s preference. Class counsel prefer to
define a class as broadly as possible within the constraints of class certification. The bigger the class, the bigger the franchise. Class action lawyers lose
nothing by agreeing to “represent” a larger pool of claimants in the settlement. If the prospect of expansive preclusion lubricates the deal, then acceding to a broader class definition enriches class lawyers by hastening the
settlement, sweetening the fees, or both. Thus, defendants and class counsel
194 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B)(ii) (establishing that class notice in a Rule 23(b)(3) class
action must clearly and concisely state “the definition of the class certified”); Mullins v.
Direct Dig., LLC, 795 F.3d 654, 659 (7th Cir. 2015) (“Rule 23 requires that a class be
defined, and experience has led courts to require that classes be defined clearly and based
on objective criteria.” (citing RUBENSTEIN, supra note 1, § 3:3)).
195 See Mullins, 795 F.3d at 660 (“Vagueness is a problem because a court needs to be
able to identify who will receive notice, who will share in any recovery, and who will be
bound by a judgment.” (citing Kent v. SunAmerica Life Ins. Co., 190 F.R.D. 271, 278 (D.
Mass. 2000))).
196 See generally Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367 (1996).
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sometimes expand their class definitions when negotiating settlement class
actions. The losers are the claimants swept in by the expanded class definition whose claims are thereby released, but who get little or nothing of value
from the deal.
In the Facebook Beacon settlement class action, for example, Facebook
and the class lawyers agreed to expand the class definition as part of their
deal. The class action was originally brought by nineteen plaintiffs on behalf
of a class of Facebook members whose private information had been disclosed by Beacon during the one month in which the program was opt-out
rather than opt-in.197 In the settlement, Facebook and class counsel
expanded the class definition to include not only those whose information
was obtained and disclosed when the program was opt-out, but also those
whose information was obtained and disclosed after Facebook changed Beacon to an opt-in program.198 For Facebook, expanding the class definition
was both advantageous and costless. The company did not agree to pay any
money damages to class members. Rather, the company agreed to spend
$6.5 million to create the Digital Trust Foundation (a cy pres remedy of dubious benefit to the class and arguably beneficial to Facebook),199 to terminate
the Beacon program by its current name (but without limiting the company’s
future conduct),200 and to pay about $3 million to the class action lawyers
and the named plaintiffs.201 Expanding the class definition did nothing to
expand the benefits obtained by the class. For Facebook, it was a costless way
to protect itself from liability from a larger group of potential plaintiffs. Why
would class counsel agree to such an expansion of the class definition? It was
costless to them, as well. For class counsel, expanding the class definition was
a way to please the defendant and secure generous fees. Expansion of the
class definition was not costless for the newly included class members, however. Their claims were traded away by class counsel, but they got nothing of
value in exchange for this imposed release of their claims.
In a settlement of state law antitrust claims against the DeBeers group of
diamond companies, the defendants obtained a troublingly broad class definition for their settlement class action.202 The settlement encompassed consumers in states where the claims were viable under state law (those in nonIllinois Brick states, meaning those states that allow indirect purchasers to pursue antitrust claims) as well as consumers in states where the claims were not
viable under state law (those in Illinois Brick states, meaning those states that
197 Marek v. Lane, 134 S. Ct. 8, 8 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., respecting the denial of
certiorari).
198 Id. at 9 (“To top it off, the parties agreed to expand the settlement class barred from
future litigation to include not just those individuals injured by Beacon during the brief
period in which it was an opt-out program—the class proposed in the original complaint—
but also those injured after Facebook had changed the program’s default setting to opt
in.”).
199 Cf. supra text accompanying notes 133–40.
200 See supra text accompanying notes 93–95.
201 Marek, 134 S. Ct. at 9 (Roberts, C.J., respecting the denial of certiorari).
202 See generally Sullivan v. DB Invs., Inc., 667 F.3d 273 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc).
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follow the federal precedent of Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois203 barring indirect
purchasers from pursuing antitrust claims). The district judge approved and
certified the settlement class action, a Third Circuit panel reversed, and the
Third Circuit, sitting en banc, vacated the reversal and affirmed the district
court’s approval of the deal.204 A dissenting judge explained the situation:
The problem, though, is that the defendants’ singular conduct here gives
rise to causes of action in some states while providing for no cause of action
at all in others. Under these circumstances, there can be no grouping of
claims into a single class action, because, by definition, some would-be class
members have no claim.205

There are several different frames through which one might view the
problem of including both types of claimants in the DeBeers settlement. It
might be framed in terms of commonality,206 predominance,207 adequacy of
representation,208 or other class certification requirements. Alternatively, it
might be framed in terms of whether some claims should have been dismissed for failure to state a claim.209 For purposes of understanding aggregation as disempowerment, however, the DeBeers settlement may be seen as
an expansive class definition that served the interests of the defendant and of
class counsel but disserved the interests of class members with viable claims.
By including additional class members whose claims were not viable under
applicable state law, the settlement diluted the value of the claims for which
the defendant was willing to pay valuable consideration. Had each group—
the Illinois-Brick-state claimants and the non-Illinois-Brick-state claimants—
been certified for litigation as a separate class action, their settlement leverage would have differed from each other, if indeed the first group could get
any settlement at all.
C.

Terms That Discourage Objections

Approval of a proposed class settlement may or may not be in the class
members’ interests; it depends upon the quality of the settlement. Both the
defendant and class counsel, however, explicitly seek judicial approval when
they put forward a class settlement proposal. We have already seen several
features designed to encourage judicial approval by making settlements
appear valuable.210 Other features aim at the same outcome not by building
up the apparent value of the deal, but rather by running interference.
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210

Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
Sullivan, 667 F.3d at 333.
Id. at 341 (Jordan, J., dissenting).
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2).
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4).
See Sullivan, 667 F.3d at 308 (majority opinion).
See supra subsections II.A.1–3.
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Class Representative Bonus

Class settlements or judgments often provide compensation to class representatives beyond their recovery as class members. Such “bonuses” are
unnecessary in securities litigation, where class representatives are typically
institutional investors with high-value claims due to the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act’s provision that the class representative presumptively
should be the class member with the largest claim.211 However, in consumer
class actions, employee class actions, or others involving relatively small
claims, courts often approve bonus payments for class representatives to compensate them for their time and effort and to incentivize others to serve as
class representatives.
When submitted as part of a class settlement, bonuses create agency
risks.212 Some courts cite the support of class representatives as a factor in
determining the fairness of a class settlement.213 Class representative
bonuses undermine whatever value the class representatives’ support may
have had for evaluating a proposed settlement and attorneys’ fees.214
In the proposed class settlement in the EasySaver Rewards Litigation, for
example, class members were to receive $20 coupons.215 Two of the class
representatives, meanwhile, would get $15,000 cash, four other class representatives would get $10,000, and two others would get $5000.216 Even if
these bonuses were appropriate amounts to compensate the particular class
representatives for their work, it is hard to see how any of these class representatives could offer useful views on whether the coupons adequately compensated the class members for their claims.
211 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I)(bb) (2012); see also RUBENSTEIN, supra note 1,
§ 17:19.
212 See, e.g., RUBENSTEIN, supra note 1, §§ 17:1, 17:3; Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, Propriety of Incentive Awards or Incentive Agreements in Class Actions, 60 A.L.R. 6th 295 (Westlaw)
(2010).
213 See, e.g., All Plaintiffs v. All Defendants, 645 F.3d 329, 334 (5th Cir. 2011) (including, as factors for class settlement approval, “the opinions of class counsel, class representatives, and absent class members” (citing In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 628 F.3d 185,
194–95 (5th Cir. 2010))); UAW v. Gen. Motors Corp., 497 F.3d 615, 632 (6th Cir. 2007); In
re Prandin Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., No. 2:10-cv-12141, 2015 WL 1396473, at *2
(E.D. Mich. Jan. 20, 2015) (approving settlement class action based in part on the fact that
the class representatives “evaluated the strength of the settlement, finding that it was fair
and reasonable”).
214 See ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, supra note 5, at 8 n.6 (“When the individual
recovery is small and the incentive bonus for the class representatives is large, that may,
standing alone, raise questions about the settlement, given that the class representatives
may have much to lose if the settlement is not approved but little to gain if the case goes to
trial and the class recovers many times what the settlement provides.”).
215 Problems with the EasySaver coupons are discussed supra at text accompanying
notes 107–10.
216 In re EasySaver Rewards Litig., 921 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1046 (S.D. Cal. 2013).
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In Eubank v. Pella,217 the named plaintiffs were given payments of $5000
or $10,000. The settlement agreement, however, provided for payments only
to representatives who supported the settlement, not to representatives who
opposed it. The district judge awarded payments to all of the class representatives notwithstanding the language of the settlement agreement, but the
Seventh Circuit noted the conflict of interest that the agreement created:
“[A]ny class representative who opposed the settlement would expect to find
himself without any compensation for his services as representative.”218
There is nothing inherently problematic about modest payments to class
representatives for their services. The problem comes from the inclusion of
such payments as part of a settlement negotiated between a defendant and
class counsel. Rather than negotiate class-representative bonuses as part of a
settlement agreement, parties should leave it to the court. Alternatively, class
counsel may suggest an amount to the court without having negotiated it
with the defendant. The judge should determine, after approval of a class
settlement, whether class representatives should be paid some amount for
their services, and if so, how much should be taken from the settlement fund
for this purpose.
2.

Fee Fund

In a class action, the judge decides what fee to grant class counsel,219 but
this has not prevented lawyers from negotiating with defendants over attorneys’ fees in conjunction with class settlements. The terms of class settlements sometimes provide that defendants will pay class counsel’s fee on top
of the settlement for the class.220 Two specific aspects of fee negotiations
deserve mention as red flags. This subsection will address segregated revertible fee funds—the practice of setting aside a separate pool of money for the
defendant to pay class counsel fees.221 The next subsection will address clear
sailing agreements—the practice of negotiating a fee amount up to which
the defendant will pay class counsel without objection.222
217 Eubank v. Pella Corp., 753 F.3d 718 (7th Cir. 2014).
218 Id. at 723.
219 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(h).
220 Class settlements for pure injunctive relief under Rule 23(b)(2) raise distinct concerns regarding fees for class counsel, at least for claims that do not involve statutory feeshifting. If the settlement neither creates a common fund from which fees can be awarded
nor creates a legal basis for a fee award to the prevailing party, it makes sense for the
defendant to reach some agreement with class counsel concerning fees. Class lawyers reasonably want some assurance of compensation in connection with a class settlement, and
defendants reasonably want to know how much they are spending to secure a settlement of
a Rule 23(b)(2) class action. Thus, the argument against fee negotiations in connection
with class settlements does not apply in the same way to injunctive class settlements. Even
so, the better practice is for parties to address the question of fees only after they have
reached agreement on the terms of the settlement for the class.
221 See, e.g., Pearson v. NBTY, Inc., 772 F.3d 778, 780 (7th Cir. 2014).
222 Redman v. RadioShack Corp., 768 F.3d 622, 637 (7th Cir. 2014).
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From the defendant’s perspective, payment of class settlements and class
counsel fees is largely zero-sum; it makes little difference to the defendant
whether the money goes to the lawyers or to the class members. To say it
makes no difference to defendants, as some assert,223 is an oversimplification,
as defendants’ interests actually cut both ways. On the one hand, repeatplayer defendants presumably do not love filling the coffers of plaintiff class
action lawyers. And, one hopes, some defendants would prefer to see their
funds go to their own consumers, investors, employees, and so on, especially
if they believe the claims have some merit. Thus, one might think that
defendants would prefer to allocate settlement funds to claimants rather
than to claimants’ lawyers. On the other hand, knowing that settlement
power is held by class counsel rather than by class members, defendants may
decide they can settle more cheaply overall by paying more to the lawyers
rather than by paying more to the class. The economics of settlement makes
this the dominant consideration. Thus, as a general matter, courts should
view negotiated class counsel fees with skepticism.
Some class settlements provide that the defendant will pay class counsel’s fees and expenses in an amount determined by the court and set aside a
separate fund for this purpose, independent of the fund for the class.224 Any
amount remaining in the fee fund, after the court’s determination of a reasonable fee, reverts to the defendant.
On the surface, such a segregated fee fund may seem attractive. By treating lawyers’ fees as an entirely separate item, a segregated fee fund gives the
appearance of protecting the class members’ ability to get their full settlement without “subtracting” attorneys’ fees. But the idea that a segregated fee
fund leaves the entire settlement to class members ignores the fact that
defendants are not willing to pay an infinite amount to settle class members’
claims. The more the defendant must set aside to pay counsel fees, the less
the defendant is willing to pay to the class members.
Problem one goes to the value of the settlement. A segregated revertible
fee fund takes money away from the class that a defendant was willing to pay
in settlement of the class members’ claims. It makes no sense to think that
the class members are getting their “full” settlement, or to think that the
segregated fund avoids “subtracting” from the settlement, if in fact the defendant was willing to pay a higher total amount in order to obtain a release of
the class claims.
Problem two does not go to the value of the settlement, but rather to
tactics in the battle between class counsel and prospective objectors. A segregated revertible fee fund is a strategy by class action lawyers to insulate their
fees from attack, as class members have no incentive to attack the fee because
a lower fee does not inure to class members’ benefit. Without objectors,
223 See, e.g., Pearson, 772 F.3d at 783 (“Rexall has no reason to care about the allocation
of its cost of settlement between class counsel and class members; all it cares about as a
rational maximizer of its net worth is the bottom line—how much the settlement is likely
to cost it.”).
224 Pearson, 722 F.3d at 780.
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courts lack the benefit of any adversarial presentation on the reasonableness
of attorneys’ fees.
3.

Clear Sailing Agreement

In some class action settlements, defendants agree not to contest class
counsel’s request for attorneys’ fees up to an agreed amount. For example,
in a recent antitrust class settlement agreement, American Express agreed
not to object to class counsel’s request for fees and expenses up to $75 million.225 The idea is that the judge has the power to award a fee to class
counsel, but rather than leave the amount to the judge’s discretion or to later
litigation, the defendant and class counsel agree on what they consider a
reasonable fee for the class to pay.
One way or another—by statutory fee-shifting, by dipping into a common fund created by the settlement, or by payment of attorneys’ fees on top
of non-monetary relief for the class—the money for class counsel’s fees will
be paid by the defendant. In another sense, however, the money comes from
the class members. It is the class members’ claims that are traded for
whatever the defendant is willing to pay. Thus, when a defendant agrees that
it will pay up to $75 million in attorneys’ fees for class counsel, the defendant
is taking $75 million of the total value that the class might receive and allocating that amount to class counsel rather than to class members.
Clear sailing provisions show up in class settlements even though courts
express concern that negotiations between class counsel and defendants over
fees may harm class members’ interests. In Allen v. Bedolla,226 the Ninth Circuit listed several “subtle signs that class counsel have allowed pursuit of their
own self-interests . . . to infect the negotiations,” including “when the parties
negotiate a ‘clear sailing arrangement’ (i.e., an arrangement where defendant will not object to a certain fee request by class counsel).”227 In Allen, a
settlement class action involving claims that a temporary staffing agency had
violated day laborers’ rights under wage and hour laws, the defendant agreed
not to dispute class counsel fees up to twenty-five percent of the settlement
fund.228 Because the district court failed to take into account the clear sailing agreement and other signs of potential procedural unfairness, the Court
of Appeals vacated the district court’s approval of the settlement class action
and remanded for more careful consideration.229
225 In re Am. Express Anti Steering Rules Antitrust Litig., Nos. 11-MD-2221, 13-CV-7355,
2015 WL 4645240, at *5 n.12 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2015) (“In the Class Settlement Agreement,
American Express agrees not to object to Class Counsel’s seeking attorneys’ fees and costs
and expenses not to exceed $75 million in aggregate, and to pay up to $75 million as
awarded by the court.” (citing Class Settlement Agreement ¶ 55, Am. Express, 2015 WL
4645240)).
226 787 F.3d 1218 (9th Cir. 2015).
227 Id. at 1224 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting In
re Bluetooth Headset Prods. Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 935, 947 (9th Cir. 2011)).
228 Id. at 1220–24.
229 Id. at 1224–26.
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The problem with clear sailing agreements is that defendants may agree
to a large fee to entice class counsel into agreeing to a weak recovery for the
class. The Seventh Circuit, in Redman v. RadioShack, explained the concern
this way:
Another questionable feature of the settlement is the inclusion of a “clearsailing clause”—a clause in which the defendant agrees not to contest class
counsel’s request for attorneys’ fees. Because it’s in the defendant’s interest
to contest that request in order to reduce the overall cost of the settlement,
the defendant won’t agree to a clear-sailing clause without compensation—
namely a reduction in the part of the settlement that goes to the class members, as that is the only reduction class counsel are likely to consider. The
existence of such clauses thus illustrates the danger of collusion in class
actions between class counsel and the defendant, to the detriment of the
class members.230

The defendant’s interest aligns with class counsel’s interest in a large fee.
Or, to be precise, their interests align up to the point at which higher fees
would increase the overall cost of the settlement to the defendant. For a
defendant, money for the class’s lawyers is money well spent if it secures a
speedy and inexpensive overall settlement.
The argument in favor of clear sailing agreements is that a settling
defendant wants to know the total cost of the settlement. If a portion of the
defendant’s payment obligation remains shrouded during negotiations, the
defendant may be reluctant to pay full value for the plaintiffs’ claims. Two
things should be noted about this argument.
First, this argument in favor of clear sailing agreements has no application to common fund settlements. If a settlement provides for the defendant
to pay $100 million into a settlement fund for distribution to class members,
the court may simply award a fee to class counsel out of the $100 million.
The defendant knows exactly how much it will pay, and there is no reason for
the defendant to be involved in negotiating class counsel’s fee.
Second, the very cases where the argument applies—that is, settlements
for non-monetary remedies—are also the cases where clear sailing agreements cause the most trouble. The Seventh Circuit spoke to this problem in
Redman:
230 Redman v. RadioShack Corp., 768 F.3d 622, 637 (7th Cir. 2014); see also Bluetooth,
654 F.3d at 947 (noting “the potential of enabling a defendant to pay class counsel excessive fees and costs in exchange for counsel accepting an unfair settlement on behalf of the
class” (quoting Lobatz v. U.S. W. Cellular of Cal., Inc., 222 F.3d 1142, 1148 (9th Cir.
2000))); RUBENSTEIN, supra note 1, § 13:9 (“These agreements are troubling because they
demonstrate that class counsel negotiated some aspect of their fee arrangement with the
defendant, when counsel’s ethical obligation is to the class, not to its own fees. Courts
worry that such agreements are indicia of collusion between class counsel and the defendant, signaling that perhaps class counsel agreed to a smaller class recovery in exchange
for a heftier fee.”). These concerns are not new. More than a decade ago, William Henderson urged courts to adopt a per se rule rejecting all class settlements that include clear
sailing agreements. William D. Henderson, Clear Sailing Agreements: A Special Form of Collusion in Class Action Settlements, 77 TUL. L. REV. 813, 830 (2003).
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[C]lear-sailing clauses are found mainly in cases such as the present one in
which the value of the settlement to the class members is uncertain because
it is not a cash settlement. This complicates the difficulty faced by the district court in determining an appropriate attorneys’ fee, and a clear-sailing
clause exacerbates the difficulty further by eliminating objections to an
excessive fee by the defendant. Clear-sailing clauses have not been held to
be unlawful per se, but at least in a case such as this, involving a non-cash
settlement award to the class, such a clause should be subjected to intense
critical scrutiny by the district court; in this case it was not.231

The upshot is that defendants ought to stay out of the business of negotiating fees for class counsel.232 The power to award a reasonable fee to class
counsel belongs to the court,233 and it is a power better exercised independent of negotiations between class counsel and the defendant. Even if discussion of fees is postponed until after other settlement terms are reached, and
even if a mediator oversees the discussion, there is much to be lost and nothing to be gained by allowing a defendant to participate in deciding how
much class counsel ought to be paid for achieving a class action settlement.
III.

ADDRESSING COUNTERARGUMENTS

Two potential counterarguments deserve attention. The first is that
even a bad class settlement is better than nothing. The second is that class
actions serve deterrence goals even if they fail to compensate class members.
Each of these counterarguments goes to this Article’s core argument that, in
settlement, aggregation disempowers claimants by delivering control to lawyers. Each of these counterarguments, therefore, also presents a challenge to
this Article’s contention that judges should exercise more rigorous control
over class settlements and class counsel fees.
A.

The Better-than-Nothing Argument

This Article has dwelt almost entirely on the negative, griping about all
that is wrong with class action settlements. It has attempted to gripe more
precisely than others have done, or at least with more systematic attention to
the connection between settlement features and the alignment of interests
between defendants and class counsel. But still, the reader might wonder
what all this negativity accomplishes. If judges throw out imperfect class settlements, and if class members are thereby left with nothing but rejected
deals, how does this advance the cause of just and efficient mass dispute resolution? Isn’t a weak class settlement better than nothing?
231 768 F.3d at 637.
232 A defendant’s participation in negotiating class counsel’s fee makes sense in a case
where an applicable fee-shifting statute imposes on the defendant the responsibility to pay
plaintiffs’ lawyers’ fees. The defendant’s participation in determining class counsel’s fee is
more difficult to justify, however, in a class action where the fee entitlement flows from
creation of a common fund.
233 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(h).
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The answer has three parts. The first part involves better class settlements in disputes that are appropriately resolved by class action. The second
involves non-class aggregate settlements in disputes that are appropriately
resolved on a non-class basis. The third involves claims of such dubious merit
that they ought not be pursued at all. When we see a troubling class settlement, we ought to ask which of these categories best describes the problem,
as each implies a different solution.
First, there is nothing inevitable about bad class settlements. None of
the problematic features outlined in this Article is a necessary attribute of
class action resolutions. Even though class lawyers’ interests align in important ways with defendants’ interests and against the interests of class members, and this alignment of interests exerts a tug in the direction of bad
settlements, lawyers rise above self-interest every day in exercising duties of
loyalty to clients. Moreover, judicial control over class settlements, appointment of class counsel, and class counsel fees gives judges power to steer negotiating parties toward appropriate settlements.234
For mass disputes that are sensibly resolved by class action—i.e., the
claims are sufficiently cohesive for representative litigation, and the claims
are sufficiently small that aggregation is needed for plaintiffs to litigate on a
level field with defendants—a settlement ought to provide real value to the
class members. For reasons I have addressed elsewhere, such settlements are
more likely to occur in class actions that have been certified for litigation
than in class actions that are certified solely for settlement.235 With certification to litigate on a class action basis, class counsel should have the leverage
to negotiate a settlement with actual value for the class. However, this does
not eliminate the risk that class counsel and defendants will negotiate a deal
that serves their aligned interests and underserves the interests of the class
members. Judges should make it clear that, in evaluating any proposed settlement, they will be sensitive to the risks of self-dealing and overvaluation.
If the plaintiffs’ claims have merit and the defendant is unwilling to offer
a meaningful remedy in exchange for release of the claims, then class counsel must be prepared to take the claims to trial. If, however, the defendant
can be persuaded to offer a meaningful remedy in settlement, then the class
should get the benefit of that remedy. Other than the fact that class counsel
have grown accustomed to including self-serving terms in class settlements,
and that defendants have grown accustomed to taking advantage of the selfinterests of class counsel, there is no reason why parties cannot negotiate
class settlements with remedies for class members proportionate to the value
of their claims. If courts were to stop approving class settlements that fail to
provide such remedies, then one can hope that counsel would stop proposing them.
Second, some mass disputes should be resolved by non-class litigation
and settlements rather than by class action. Multidistrict litigation in federal
234
235

See infra text accompanying notes 221–37.
See Erichson, supra note 50.
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court and consolidated statewide litigation in state court permit centralized
handling of related claims even when those claims cannot meet the standard
of cohesiveness required for class certification. Collective settlement negotiations in mass non-class litigation can present some of the same problems as
class actions,236 but in the non-class setting, each claimant has the right to
decide individually whether to accept the defendant’s offer in exchange for a
release of claims. Thus, while self-serving conduct by counsel can occur
outside of class actions, at least there is the backstop of client consent.237
Finally, what if a settlement provides remedies of dubious value because
that is what the plaintiffs’ claims are actually worth? Perhaps empty injunctive relief and worthless coupons truly were the best that could be negotiated
for the class because the defendant knew that the plaintiffs had little chance
of prevailing on the merits of their claims. If the claims are so weak that the
plaintiffs’ lawyers are unwilling to take the claims to trial and unable to
extract from the defendant anything of value for the claimants, then the “resolution” of the claims serves no function other than to trade nuisance value
for attorneys’ fees. Such claims are better left unasserted. By rejecting proposed class settlements with the problematic features catalogued in this Article, courts can encourage class action lawyers to abandon claims that have so
little value that they cannot produce worthy settlements, and they can
encourage defendants and class action lawyers to negotiate appropriate settlements for claims that have real value.
B.

The Private Attorney General Argument

Class actions serve not only the goal of compensating class members, but
also the goals of forcing defendants to disgorge wrongful gains and deterring
others from engaging in illegal conduct. Class action lawyers thus serve as
private attorneys general, and the settlements that they negotiate are public
goods. By understanding the class action as a law-enforcement mechanism,
we can see that the individual class member’s check for $3.19 pales in comparison to the value of the class action’s deterrent and disgorgement functions. Therefore, one might argue, this Article’s obsession with value for
class members is misplaced, and any measure of claimant empowerment
ought to take into account not only class member compensation, but also
deterrence and disgorgement.
The answer is that the settlement features criticized in this Article do not
merely reduce value for class members; they also reduce cost for defendants.
The first five features discussed in this Article—spurious injunctive relief,
non-transferable and non-stackable coupons, unwarranted cy pres, unnecessary or burdensome claims procedures, and reversion clauses—allow defendants to reduce settlement costs while inflating settlement valuations to secure
judicial approval. When Gillette agrees to a labeling change on a discontin236
237

See Erichson, All-or-Nothing, supra note 12.
See Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 12.
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ued line of Duracell batteries, it costs the defendant nothing.238 When
ProFlowers offers restricted, non-stackable credits and asks the court to consider them at face value, the defendant saves money and perhaps even sees a
net profit.239 When Kellogg donates food to charities, the donation costs the
defendant less than the asserted valuation; indeed, it may cost the defendant
nothing if the donation replaces otherwise-intended donations or uses product surplus, and it may serve the defendants’ interests for taxes, public relations, or otherwise.240 When Rexall discourages claims by creating an
onerous claims process, it reduces its payouts.241 Reversion clauses, most
explicitly of all, give money back to the defendant.242
The next two features—overbroad release and expanded class definition—allow defendants to expand their protection from liability at zero or
low cost.243 The key to understanding aggregation as disempowerment is the
alignment of interests between defendants and class counsel on particular
settlement terms. Expansive claim preclusion, whether by inclusive release
or by expanded class definition, gives a defendant broader protection from
liability and gives a class action lawyer more business. These terms allow
defendants to reduce their average cost per claim, and protect defendants
from future liability, thus disserving the goals of deterrence and
disgorgement.
The final three features—class representative bonuses, revertible fee
funds, and clear sailing agreements—may appear to involve additional costs
for defendants, but actually reduce defendants’ overall settlement costs. By
agreeing to pay bonuses to class representatives, and more importantly by
agreeing to pay hefty fees to class counsel, defendants hope to secure agreement to favorable settlement terms. While the payment of large class counsel
fees imposes a cost on defendants, a defendant’s willingness to pay those fees
presumably depends on a prediction that what it spends on fees is more than
made up by what it saves on the overall settlement. Otherwise, the defendant
could leave it to the court, rather than negotiate an amount that it is willing
to pay without objection.244
The bottom line is that problematic class action settlements not only
compensate class members too little; they also cost defendants too little.
Aggregation as disempowerment thus presents a problem regardless of
whether one focuses on the class action’s compensation function or its law
enforcement function.
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PROBLEM

The Judge’s Role

The problem of bad class settlements is solvable. Because class actions
bind absentees, the law imposes procedural safeguards on class actions, giving judges the tools needed to address the problems identified in this Article.
The settlement of any class action requires judicial approval based upon a
finding that the settlement is “fair, reasonable, and adequate.”245 As importantly, the judge may award “reasonable attorney’s fees,”246 and the judge
controls the appointment of class counsel.247
When considering proposed class settlements and requests for class
counsel fees, judges not only should look generally at the value of the proposed settlement in light of the strength of the claims and the risks of litigation, but should look specifically for the types of settlement terms discussed
above.248 To the extent a proposed settlement includes an injunctive component, the change in the defendant’s conduct should address the problems
complained of in the plaintiffs’ pleading. If the settlement includes coupons,
credits, or vouchers, they should be stackable and transferrable so that they
are valuable in both senses of the word (provide value and permit valuation).
To whatever extent the settlement includes a cy pres distribution—which
should occur only where a direct remedy is not feasible—the recipient
should serve the interests of class members to remedy the claims as nearly as
possible. Monetary and other remedies should be provided directly to class
members where feasible. If a settlement must employ a claims-made process
because class members cannot adequately be identified or their claims adequately quantified, then the process should be no more burdensome than
necessary. Funds remaining after a claims process should be distributed to
the class rather than revert to the defendant. The class definition and the
scope of the release should match the claims that class counsel was litigating
on behalf of the class. And fees for class counsel, as well as any bonus payments for class representatives, should be left to the court rather than negotiated as part of a class settlement.
With procedural safeguards built into the class action rule, and with the
well-established principle that judges must attend to the interests of absent
class members, why do inadequate class settlements survive judicial review?
One answer may be that U.S. judges, steeped in the adversary system, are illequipped for the inquisitorial judging required for careful review of class
245 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2).
246 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(h).
247 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g). Because Rule 23 already gives judges power over settlement,
fees, and appointment, solving the problems identified in this Article requires neither legislation nor rule amendment.
248 See supra Part II.
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settlements.249 Another may be that judges themselves have an interest in
bringing comprehensive settlements to fruition.250
Recent signals from the judiciary, however, give cause for optimism. As
discussed in Section I.B, recent federal appellate decisions display a new level
of savviness about the incentives of class counsel and defendants.251 The Delaware Chancery Court recently has shown similar skepticism and care in the
context of disclosure-only settlements in corporate merger litigation.252
District Judge William Alsup of the Northern District of California has a
standard order that he issues when lawyers begin negotiating a class settlement in any action before him.253 Under the title “Notice Regarding Factors
to be Evaluated for Any Proposed Class Settlement,” Judge Alsup spells out
his expectations and concerns. He begins by stating, “[T]he Court prefers to
litigate and vet a class certification motion before any settlement discussions
take place. That way, the class certification is a done deal and cannot compromise class claims.”254 He explains that he will analyze the adequacy of the
settlement in terms of its actual benefits to the class: “In the proposed settlement, what will absent class members give up versus what will they receive in
exchange, i.e., a cost-benefit analysis?”255 He says that “[t]he release should
be limited only to the claims certified for class treatment,” and that class
counsel must justify the scope of the release.256 He notes that expansions of
the class definition “will be viewed with suspicion,” and that “settlement dollars must be sufficient to cover the old scope plus the new scope.”257 He calls
reversion of settlement funds “a red flag, for it runs the risk of an illusory
settlement, especially when combined with a requirement to submit claims
that may lead to a shortfall in claim submissions.”258 As to the procedure for
submitting claims, he notes the problems with some claim processes and sensibly points out that the best approach, when feasible, is “to calculate settlement checks from a defendant’s records (plus due diligence performed by
counsel) and to send the checks to the class members along with a notice
that cashing the checks will be deemed acceptance of the release and all
other terms of the settlement.”259 On the question of fees for class counsel,
Judge Alsup’s order states that he “prefers that all settlements avoid any
249 See Erichson, supra note 7, at 2010–15.
250 See Erichson & Zipurksy, supra note 12, at 291.
251 See supra text accompanying notes 53–62.
252 See In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 887 (Del. Ch. 2016) (“If
approved, the settlement will not provide Trulia stockholders with any economic benefits.
The only money that would change hands is the payment of a fee to plaintiffs’ counsel.”).
253 See, e.g., Notice Regarding Factors to Be Evaluated for Any Proposed Class Settlement, Hee Nam You v. Hirohito, No. C 15-03257, 2016 WL 3405444 (N.D. Cal. June 21,
2016).
254 Id. at 2 (emphasis in original).
255 Id. at 3.
256 Id.
257 Id. at 3–4.
258 Id. at 4.
259 Id.
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agreement as to attorney’s fees and leave that to the judge. If the defense
insists on an overall cap, then the Court will decide how much will go to the
class and how much will go to counsel.”260 Finally, as to incentive payments
for class representatives, he asks, “If the proposed settlement by itself is not
good enough for the named plaintiff, why should it be good enough for
absent class members similarly situated?”261
Judge Alsup’s standard order makes such good sense, one wonders why
every district judge doesn’t do the same. Old habits die hard. The American
judicial mindset is geared toward adversarial expectations, promotion of settlement, and the presumption that a settlement negotiated by seemingly
adversary counsel represents fair value. The fact that problematic class settlements continue to be negotiated and approved is worrisome. But the fact
that at least some judges recognize the red flags, and that courts increasingly
note the ways that class counsel and defendants take advantage of the
powerlessness of class members, gives reason for hope in the future of class
actions as a tool for empowerment rather than disempowerment.
B.

Lawyer Ethics

What about legal ethics? If lawyers use the power of their role to enrich
themselves at the expense of the class members they purport to represent,
doesn’t this violate the lawyers’ ethical duties? The short answer is yes. Lawyers involved in class settlement negotiations should approach those negotiations with sensitivity to their obligations to their clients and to the profession.
In terms of policing, however, except in egregious cases, agency problems in
class actions are better addressed by procedural safeguards than by ethical
safeguards.
For purposes of conflict of interest rules, the relationship between class
counsel and class members differs from a standard lawyer-client relationship.262 The class action lawyer nonetheless owes a duty to represent the
interests of the class competently and loyally.263 A class action lawyer negoti260 Id.
261 Id. at 6. Payments to class representatives, under some circumstances, may properly
compensate and incentivize service. Generally there should be no need for such payments
to be negotiated with a defendant. Thus, when negotiating parties include class representative bonuses as part of their proposed settlement, a judge may consider it a red flag even
if the judge is open to awarding class representatives a modest payment out of the settlement fund. See supra text accompanying notes 189–95.
262 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 25 (2016) (“When a lawyer represents or seeks to represent a class of plaintiffs or defendants in a class-action lawsuit,
unnamed members of the class are ordinarily not considered to be clients of the lawyer for
purposes of applying paragraph (a)(1) of this Rule.”).
263 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(4) (“Duty of Class Counsel. Class counsel must fairly and
adequately represent the interests of the class.”); Ass’n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., Prof’l
Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 2004-01: Lawyers in Class Actions (2004) [hereinafter Formal
Opinion 2004-01] (explaining that a class action lawyer owes duties of competence, diligence, and confidentiality to the class). One district judge, rejecting a proposed settlement class action, asked:
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ating a settlement must act in the best interests of the class,264 not in the
lawyer’s self-interest to maximize the fee.265 Defense lawyers, for their part,
should remember that it is unethical to “knowingly assist or induce another”
to violate rules of professional conduct,266 so to the extent class lawyers violate duties to class members by negotiating self-serving class settlement terms,
defense lawyers likewise violate professional duties by knowingly offering or
accepting such terms.
That said, one should not expect disciplinary proceedings to serve as the
first line of defense against bad class settlements. Whereas ethical protections play more of a foreground role in non-class aggregate settlements,267
class actions rely on procedural safeguards and judicial supervision. For one
thing, the burdens of proof differ between procedural safeguards and disciplinary proceedings.268 In the event of a bad class settlement, it is harder for
a disciplinary committee to find by clear and convincing evidence that a lawyer violated ethical duties than for a judge to find that settlement proponents
failed to meet their burden of establishing the settlement’s fairness by a preponderance of the evidence. The class action rule explicitly incorporates
protections for absent class members because of the nature of representative
litigation, in contrast to non-class collective representation, which takes procedurally disparate forms, and where theoretically individual client-lawyer
relationships and theoretically consensual settlements rely upon ethical
rather than procedural constraints.269
CONCLUSION
Aggregate litigation, at its best, empowers claimants to pursue meritorious claims on a level field. At its worst, however, aggregation does little more
than suck value out of claims. What makes aggregation empowering—lawHave Class Counsel lost sight of the fact that they purport to represent [class
members]? The court is concerned that none of the Co-Lead Class Counsel were,
or are, acting in the class’s best interests, as opposed to their own interests in
effectuating this settlement agreement and collecting a fee.
In re Am. Express Anti Steering Rules Antitrust Litig., Nos. 11-MD-2221, 13-CV-7355, 2015
WL 4645240, at *20 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2015).
264 See Formal Opinion 2004-01, supra note 263 (“A class lawyer’s decision to support or
oppose a settlement must be made in the best interests of the class.”)
265 See id. (“A class lawyer’s decision, likewise, may not be influenced by the lawyer’s
desire to increase the fees he or she will receive. Thus, the lawyer negotiating a class action
settlement may not seek more favorable fee provisions in exchange for less favorable relief
for the class.”).
266 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(a) (2016).
267 See Erichson, Typology, supra note 12.
268 Compare In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mex., on
Apr. 20, 2010, 910 F. Supp. 2d 891, 912 (E.D. La. 2012) (requiring a preponderance of the
evidence standard for the fairness of a class settlement), with MODEL RULES FOR LAWYER
DISCIPLINARY ENF’T R. 18(c) (2002) (requiring a clear and convincing standard for ethical
disciplinary proceedings).
269 See Erichson, supra note 1, at 530–43.
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yers’ control of numerous claims—creates the risk that settlement negotiations will leave the negotiation participants with much and the claimants
themselves with little. Defendants suck value out of claims to gain protection
from liability. Class action lawyers suck value out of claims to gain personal
enrichment. What they have in common is an interest in taking value from
the claims by negotiating mutually favorable settlement terms.
This Article has shown the disempowering effect of class actions in the
settlement context, and has suggested that certain settlement features ought
to lead judges to question proposed settlements and fee requests. Thinking
critically about settlements always presents a challenge. Settlement evaluation requires knowledge of the value of the underlying claims, but claims vary
enormously in their factual and legal merits and, by definition, claims
released in settlement have not been litigated to completion. But even when
one cannot confidently ascertain the value of unlitigated claims, one can
look at specific terms of settlement deals and ask whether those terms deliver
little or no value to class members while serving the aligned interests of class
counsel and defendants. That is what this Article has done. It has told the
story of aggregation as disempowerment by focusing on how the problem
manifests in the terms of actual class settlements.
By training attention on problematic settlement features, this Article has
sought not only to offer vivid illustrations of the problem, but also to provide
a usable catalogue of red flags for judges reviewing class action settlement
proposals and fee requests. It has examined terms that defendants and class
action lawyers employ to create an exaggerated appearance of value, terms
that expand defendants’ protection and class counsels’ franchise, and terms
that discourage objections to the settlement and fees. With sharper awareness of the shape that disempowerment takes, judges and lawyers can work
more effectively to preserve what is right about aggregate litigation.
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